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I. INTRODUCTION 
Elizabeth Smart may be a household name, but the names of the 
thousands of foster children currently missing from our child welfare system 
are unknown to the American public and even to some of the agencies legally 
responsible for their care. Each year, vast numbers of these young people, who 
are predominantly children of color, become victims of sexual exploitation 
while in the custody of the state or shortly after their planned release. At this 
rate, and given population trends, the number of sexually exploited youth with 
a history of foster care will climb to close to half a million in the next 
generation.1 
The plight of these young people raises a unique legal question: Do 
state and contract agencies bare any liability for this exploitation? Foster 
children are in a unique position vis-a-vis the Constitution. They are wards of 
the state but actually fare worse in federal courts than prisoners and 
institutionalized adults, in terms of their right to be free from harm while in 
custody. To be fair, it is not easy to monitor foster children; they are statutorily 
entitled to the least restrictive foster care placement, as they should be. But 
every effort should be made to ensure that they go unscathed. Too often, as a 
result of institutional indifference, older foster youth are harmed due to a lack 
of commitment to addressing their needs. 
Even if it were well settled that the state owes a unique duty to foster 
children, would this duty extend to youth who have absconded from custody 
and been lured into “criminal” activity? What about youth who have been 
discharged, but to precarious situations that put them at foreseeable risk? 
Recent federal legislation regarding the sexual exploitation of foster youth 
demonstrates political concern on the national stage, but the laws have no teeth. 
Our states and localities do not actually invest in this population; nor do our 
federal or state lawmakers hold anyone accountable for what happens to 
adolescents while they are in the foster care system or following discharge. Are 
we finally ready to hold child welfare agencies accountable for what happens to 
foster children when they are missing or discharged from the system? Could 
federal courts address this epidemic? 
Constitutional law regarding prisoners, institutionalized adults, and the 
residents of nursing homes suggests that it is time for the judiciary to step in. 
The civil rights of other populations have not been addressed from the ground 
up without court intervention. Unless we hold state agencies accountable, they 
will never fully address the needs of adolescents in foster care; nor will they 
truly revolutionize their service models to provide client-centered services that 
actually work. Litigation is necessary in order to effectuate foster children’s 
rights and realize actual reform in the child welfare system. 
1 See infra notes 104, 137; see also infra Part II for an explanation of this projection. 
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This paper examines the civil rights of youth who are missing or 
discharged from foster care and become victims of sexual exploitation. It also 
addresses future implications of this epidemic, given demographic patterns of 
the United States, if we do not address this issue now. Section II describes the 
demographics of adolescents in foster care. Next, Section III addresses the 
sexual exploitation of this population. Section IV describes the legal framework 
of the foster care system and legislation pertaining to sexually exploited youth. 
Section V analyzes the constitutional rights of foster youth who become 
victims of sexual exploitation and draws analogies to similarly situated groups 
whose rights have been more firmly established by federal courts. Finally, 
Section VI concludes that adolescents in foster care have a constitutional right 
to be free from state action which puts them at risk for sexual exploitation. 
II. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE
A. Adolescents Currently in Foster Care 
Even though children in foster care are technically in the custody of the 
state and each one should be accounted for, it is difficult to gauge precise 
numbers of adolescents in foster care because of well-documented challenges 
in the child welfare system.2 These include, “poor monitoring[;] . . . inadequate 
policies, training, and supervision; lack of effective decision making tools and 
safety assessment protocols; and poor tracking systems, along with high 
caseloads that limit the time available for visiting with families and 
documenting cases,” according to the Child Welfare League of America.3 
Close to half of the children in foster care in the United States are 
adolescents. In 2012, 46% were preteenagers and teenagers (11 and older);4 
youth ages 16 and older make up approximately 19% of all children in foster 
care.5 The vast majority of these youth will be discharged by the state to their 
own legal custody, which is commonly referred to as being discharged to 
“independent living.”6 This means that at age 18, 19, or 21 (depending on state 
2 CAREN KAPLAN, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILDREN MISSING FROM CARE: AN 
ISSUE BRIEF ix (2014), available at http://66.227.70.18/programs/fostercare/childmiss01.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2012 ESTIMATES AS OF NOV. 2013 1 (2013) [hereinafter AFCARS NOV.
REPORT], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport20.pdf. 
5 Id.; see also LAUREN EYSTER & SARAH LOONEY OLDMIXON, NGA CENTER FOR BEST 
PRACTICES, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE POLICIES TO HELP YOUTH TRANSITION OUT OF FOSTER CARE 2 
(2007), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/0701YOUTH.PDF. 
6 Young People Leave Foster Care to a Family, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES
INITIATIVE, http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/young-people-leave-foster-care-family (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2015) (“Historically, child welfare agencies, having been created to protect children and 
support families, routinely authorized permanency plans of ‘independent living’ for older youth 
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law) the youth are on their own, not the legal responsibility of any caring 
adult.7 This is also known as “aging out of foster care.” 
Aging out is on the rise, despite efforts to eliminate “independent 
living” as a foster care goal.8 According to numerous studies, approximately 
30,000 young people officially age out of foster care each year in the United 
States.9 Since 1999, more than 230,000 young people have been discharged 
from foster care without a permanent family to go home to;10 more than 
165,000 from 1998 to 2005.11 Most importantly, during this same seven-year 
period (1998 to 2005, which is the last period for which aggregate data is 
available), the percentage of all foster children who age out steadily increased 
each year, and as of 2005, stood at 4.9%.12 Some states have shocking 
percentages of youth who age out—Virginia leads the pack, with 21% of the 
state’s entire foster care population aging out, and Maine is close behind with 
in foster care.”); see also John Kelly, APPLA: The Foster Care Exception That Ate the Rule, THE 
CHRON. OF SOC. CHANGE (Aug. 15, 2013), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/analysis/appla-the-
foster-care-exception-that-ate-the-rule/3756 (“Among youths that had reached 17 in foster 
care . . . close to half had APPLA as an expected outcome.”); AFCARS NOV. REPORT, supra note 
4 (stating that 21% of children in foster care had a goal other than adoption or reunification, 
including goals of emancipation and long-term foster care); Jennifer Renee & Gerald P. Mallon, 
Unpacking the No of Permanency for Youth: Overuse and Misuse of APPLA, THE HANDBOOK OF 
CHILD WELFARE, PRACTICES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS (Columbia Univ. Press 2014), available at 
http://www.nrcpfc.org/as-training/download/33.Renne.APPLA.Final.03.16.2012.pdf (stating that 
in some states the goal of “long term foster care” is only available for a child over 12 years of 
age, so all of the children with that goal are adolescents and will age out of foster care). 
7 Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
351, § 201(a), 122 Stat. 3949, 3957–58 (giving states the option of keeping 18-year-olds in foster 
care); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 303 (2013) (extending the age of foster care to 21 in 
California); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-600 (2014). 
8 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (The 
five permissible ASFA permanency plans are: return to parent; adoption; referral for legal 
guardianship; permanent placement with a fit and willing relative; another planned permanent 
living arrangement (but only if there is a compelling reason why none of the other ASFA 
permanency plans is in the child’s best interests)). For a discussion of foster care goals, see infra 
Part III. 
9 Foster Care Resource Center, CHILDREN’S ACTION NETWORK, http://childrensaction 
network.org/resources.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
 10 Aging Out, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/ 
about/aging-out (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
 11 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TIME FOR REFORM: AGING OUT AND ON THEIR OWN 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter TIME FOR REFORM], available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded 
files/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/foster_care_reform/KidsareWaitingTimeforReform0307pdf.pdf; 
Research, AGING OUT INSTITUTE, http://agingoutinstitute.com/research-3 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) [hereinafter Research]. 
 12 TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 11. 
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19%.13 Thirteen other states all age at least 10% of their foster children out of 
foster care.14 
In fact, thousands of youth currently in foster care have been assigned 
goals by their state agencies that are essentially the same as independent living, 
but with new names, such as “emancipation” or “long-term foster care.”15 
These permanency goals indicate that child welfare officials no longer focus on 
seeking families or other supportive adults to help transition these older youths 
from foster care. In 2005, approximately 32,000 adolescents had a goal of 
“emancipation,” and more than 37,000 had a goal of “long term foster care.”16 
These 69,000 youths, and those that have followed in the past nine years, were 
on a path to leave foster care without a permanent family to count on.17 
B. Adolescents Missing from Foster Care 
Another estimated 30,000 youths age out of the foster care system but 
are not officially counted by the state as discharged, because they run away or 
are otherwise unable to be located by the state.18 Child welfare professionals—
caseworkers, social workers, therapists, lawyers, and judges—routinely refer to 
runaways from foster care, as Absent Without Leave, or “AWOL.” This 
language speaks to the impersonal and implicitly punitive nature of the system. 
Children who run away from their family homes are never called AWOL by 
anyone, even when they appear in court or at an institution such as a shelter. 
This Article does not use this negative terminology; instead, in line with other 
studies, the Article includes as “missing” foster children all those who have 
either left care voluntarily (i.e., run away) or involuntarily (i.e., been abducted) 
and/or cannot otherwise be accounted for by the agency responsible for their 
placement (i.e., lost in care).19 
It is extremely difficult to ascertain precise numbers of missing foster 
children because inherently, these children are lost and state and local 
authorities have no incentive to report them as such or acknowledge that they 
have lost track of their wards. In fact, there are no provisions in the federal 
legislation governing foster care20 that specifically address the prevention, 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Long-Term Foster Care Custody Act, ch. 139, 1992 N.J. Laws 1059; see 42 U.S.C § 677 
(2013). 
 16 TIME FOR REFORM, supra note 11, at 3. 
 17 Id. 
 18 The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Aging Out of Foster Care (PBS television broadcast May 
19, 2005). 
 19 KAPLAN, supra note 3, at viii. 
 20 See infra Part III. 
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response to, or resolution of missing episodes.21 Caseworkers are not required 
to report missing foster children to the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children (NCMEC), the agency whose federal mandate22 is to work 
in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice to help states find missing 
children (including foster children), eliminate child sexual exploitation, and 
prevent child victimization. Although state agencies make reports to the federal 
government,23 the federal government does not follow up on what happens to 
these children or on whether these numbers are accurate.24 Moreover, each state 
has its own internal reporting and classification systems for youth who run;25 
some do not classify “runaways” at all.26 One thing we know for sure: 61% of 
homeless 18- and 19-year-olds have been in foster care at some point.27 
No national numbers are available regarding the number of youth who 
run away from foster care.28 However, data from the Adoption and Foster Care 
Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS)29 collected by the federal 
government indicate that on September 30, 2009, 8,047 foster youth were on 
 21 SHANNON WILBER ET AL., CWLA BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES 10 (2006) [hereinafter 
CWLA], available at http://familyproject.sfsu.edu/sites/sites7.sfsu.edu.familyproject/files/best 
practiceslgbtyouth.pdf. 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 5773 (2013); see Congressional Authorization, NAT’L CENTER FOR MISSING
AND EXPLOITED CHILD., http://www.missingkids.com/Authorization (last visited Dec. 23, 2014) 
[hereinafter Congressional Authorization]. A summary of NCMEC’s duties include: operating a 
national 24-hour toll-free telephone line by which individuals may report information regarding 
the location of any missing child and assisting the efforts of law enforcement agencies in 
coordinating with child welfare agencies to respond to foster children missing from the state 
welfare system. They also provide technical assistance to law enforcement agencies and first 
responders in identifying, locating, and recovering victims of, and children at risk for, child sex 
trafficking. Id. 
 23 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2009 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2010 1 (2013) [hereinafter AFCARS JULY
REPORT], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport17.pdf. 
 24 CWLA, supra note 21. There are no provisions in federal foster care law which specifically 
address or require states to report missing foster children, nor are there any that require the 
federal government to track missing foster children. Id. 
 25 MICHAEL PERGAMIT & MICHELLE ERNST, RUNNING AWAY FROM FOSTER CARE: YOUTH’S 
KNOWLEDGE AND ACCESS OF SERVICES 8 (2011), available at http://www.1800runaway.org/ 
assets/1/7/NORC_Part_C_Final.pdf. 
 26 Id.; Todd Wallack, Hundreds May Be Missing in Child Welfare System, BOSTON GLOBE
(Feb. 27, 2014), available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/2014/02/27/hundreds-kids-may-
missing-state-welfare-system/t5qc84Uzd8LWiphMl5ecFP/story.html. 
 27 LEGAL CTR. FOR FOSTER CARE & EDUC., WHAT CHILD WELFARE ADVOCATES CAN DO FOR
UNACCOMPANIED YOUTH (2008) [hereinafter WELFARE ADVOCATES], available at http://center. 
serve.org/nche/downloads/child_wel_uy.pdf. 
 28 PERGAMIT & ERNST, supra note 25. 
 29 AFCARS JULY REPORT, supra note 23. 
CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  2:41 PM 
2015] CIVIL RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE 1231 
runaway status.30 Significantly, 5.5% of the youths ages 14 to 17 in placement 
were on runaway status;31 roughly 8% of all 17-year-olds were on runaway 
status.32 Because these counts were taken on a single day, they underestimate 
the percentage of youth who may have run away at some time during that year 
or during their entire time in foster care.33 Also, individual states (and counties) 
have different practices for categorizing a child as a runaway.34 For example, 
according to state records, there were zero 17-year-olds on runaway “status” in 
New Hampshire on September 30, 2009, but in Texas, 17.4% of all 17-year-
olds were on runaway status.35 Eleven states and the District of Columbia do 
not use “runaway” as a reason for official discharge, but in Oregon, 17.2% of 
children are discharged as runaways.36 It is impossible, therefore, to know how 
much of the disparity in runaway “rates” is due to real differences in youth 
behavior and how much is due to different coding practices.37 However, 
according to this wildly inconsistent data, of all youths discharged from care 
during 2009, 2% were discharged due to being on runaway status;38 3.5% of all 
17-year-olds were discharged as runaways.39 
There are also a significant number of minors who should be taken in 
to custody by a state’s child welfare system after being kicked out or running 
away from home, but who, for various reasons, are not picked up. These youths 
fall through the cracks for two primary reasons:  
First, child welfare agencies often hesitate to take custody of 
older youth. Appropriate placements are scarce, and achieving 
permanency is challenging. Second, many unaccompanied 
youth strive to avoid entering the child welfare system, due to 
loyalty to parents, fear of retribution against themselves or 
siblings, unwillingness to relinquish control over their lives, or 
mistrust of the child welfare system.40  
A U.S. Department of Health and Human Services study found that 46% of 
homeless youth left their family’s home (not foster home) because of physical 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Pergamit, supra note 25, at 8. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 9. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Welfare Advocates, supra note 27. 
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abuse; 17% left because of sexual abuse.41 Over 50% of young people in 
shelters and on the streets report that their parents told them to leave or knew 
they were leaving and did not care.42 Each year, 1.6 to 1.7 million youths run 
away or are forced out of their homes by their parents or other caretakers.43 
As far as raw numbers regarding foster children who are missing or 
have run away, the only data available are from sporadic reports in newspapers 
and independent investigations. In 2002, Michigan acknowledged that it had 
lost track of 302 foster children.44 In the 1990s, New York City recorded an 
average of 4,000 runaways from foster care per year.45 Florida acknowledged 
648 missing children in 2006.46 But, again, these are inherently underestimates; 
they only include children classified by state governments as “runaways,” and, 
as noted, some states do not even use this classification.47 It does not count all 
the children the state cannot physically locate at any given point in time. 
Studies by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) indicate higher 
raw numbers of runaway and missing foster children than the individual state 
and city accounts discussed above. The Vera Institute in New York City found 
that of those youths who first enter foster care as adolescents, 40% had at least 
one reported “missing” child during their time in care.48 According to another 
study, 46% of 17-year-olds in foster care in Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin 
reported having run away at some time;49 in Illinois alone, the rate was 52%.50 
Nearly two-thirds of those who ran away did so more than once.51 A similar 
 41 11 Facts About Homeless Teens, DOSOMETHING.ORG, https://www.dosomething.org/facts/ 
11-facts-about-homeless-teens (last visited Dec. 24, 2014). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Welfare Advocates, supra note 27. 
 44 Jack Kresnack, Reporting Holds Michigan’s Child Welfare System Accountable, NEIMAN
REP. (June 15, 2004), http://niemanreports.org/articles/reporting-holds-michigans-child-welfare-
system-accountable/. 
 45 TIMOTHY ROSS, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW
YORK CITY’S FOSTER CARE SYSTEM AT THE YEAR 2000 (2001), available at http://www.vera.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/All_Exec_Summaries.pdf. 
 46 Who’s Looking for Foster Care’s Lost Children, ABC NEWS (June 4, 2006), http://abc 
news.go.com/WNT/FosterCare/story?id=2038588. 
 47 Id. 
 48 MARNI FINKLESTEIN, VERA INST. OF TECH., YOUTH WHO CHRONICALLY AWOL FROM
FOSTER CARE: WHY THEY RUN, WHERE THEY GO, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE 3 (2004), available 
at http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Foster_AWOLs.pdf. 
 49 PERGAMIT & ERNST, supra note 25, at 1 (citing MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST
EVALUATION OF ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: CONDITIONS OF YOUTH 
PREPARING TO LEAVE STATE CARE (2004), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/ 
files/ChapinHallDocument_8.pdf). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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study of 17-year-olds in Los Angeles foster care found 36% had run away from 
care at least once.52 
According to a 2013 article in The Oklahoman, children in a foster care 
shelter are free to leave at any time and “if the child is above the age of 15, or 
sometimes if they are above the age of 13 and ‘seem particularly mature,’ the 
shelter staff will not follow the child nor will the police be called.”53 The 
National Runaway Safeline has found that less than one quarter of youths are in 
touch with their caseworker while on a runaway episode.54 
The National Runaway Safeline’s research also indicates that youths 
are both literally and figuratively overlooked by caseworkers. According to 
their field work, youth who run away want to see their families more often and 
believe that more needs to be done to obviate the effects of being placed away 
from their neighborhood, family, and friends.55 The foster youth they 
interviewed reported a strong desire for someone to talk to, someone who will 
listen to them and help work through problems.56 The youths felt that 
caseworkers do not provide the support they need and that caseworkers should 
visit more often.57 According to the study, most youths do not hate the system 
or blame it for having to remove them from their home; they just want it to 
work better.58 
The Vera Institute conducted research which underscores why so many 
children stay away after they run.  
Youths returning to foster care after an AWOL may not be able 
to return to the foster home they left, either because foster 
parents will not take them back or because a group home filled 
their beds if they were gone for more than three days. For the 
youth, losing their bed may mean staying the night at an 
emergency placement facility, registering in a new school, and 
 52 Id. (citing MICHAEL R. PERGAMIT & HEIDI JOHNSON, EXTENDING FOSTER CARE AGE TO 21:
IMPLICATIONS AND ESTIMATES FROM YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE IN LOS ANGELES (2009), 
available at http://www.careerladdersproject.org/docs/Final%20Report%20-%20Urban%20 
Institute.pdf.). 
 53 Conna Craig, Protect Foster Children from Sex Trafficking, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/10/23/children-sex-trade-foster-care-column/3153 
537/. 
 54 NAT’L RUNAWAY SAFELINE, http://www.1800runaway.org/learn/research/why_they_run/ 
foster_fact_sheet/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2014). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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developing relationships with new caregivers and 
housemates.59 
Despite the numbers and consequences of runaways, the Vera Institute 
and The National Runaway Safeline are some of the only organizations that 
have actually studied the issue in depth and, most importantly, surveyed youth 
themselves. According to the Child Welfare League of America, the field has 
“a dearth of research on children missing from”60 out-of-home care—or even 
promising practices—“in the prevention of, response to, and resolution of 
missing from care episodes.”61 This is indicative of the overall indifference to 
this population. 
C. The Disproportionality of Adolescents of Color in Foster Care 
Unlike figures on runaways, the disproportionality of minority children 
in the foster care system has been well documented and studied.62 In 2008, of 
the estimated 399,546 children in foster care, 54% were Black, Hispanic, or 
Multiracial.63 During the same time, only 37% of the general population was 
Black, Hispanic, or Multiracial.64 The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services reported in 2003 that although black children accounted for 15% of 
the total child population, they made up 25% of victims in substantiated cases 
of child maltreatment and 45% of children in foster care.65 American Indian 
children compose 2% of the foster care population, nearly double their rate in 
the general population.66 According to the official data, Hispanic children are 
 59 Finkelstein, supra note 48, at 1. 
 60 CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM., CHILDREN MISSING FROM CARE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EXPERT PANEL MEETING 7 (Mar. 8–9, 2004), available at http://66.227.70.18/programs/fostercare/ 
childmissmtg.pdf. 
 61 Id. at 4. 
 62 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-816, AFRICAN AMERICAN
CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/263615.pdf; 
CHAPIN HALL, UNIV. OF CHI., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY AND DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD
WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2009) [hereinafter RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY], available at 
http://cjjr.georgetown.edu./pdfs/cjjr_ch_final.pdf; Disproportionate Representation of Children 
and Youth of Color, NAT’L RESOURCE CENTER FOR PERMANENCY AND FAM. CONNECTIONS,
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/info_services/disproportionate.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2015). 
 63 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD 
WELFARE (2011) [hereinafter ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY], available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf. 
 64 Eric Kayne, Census: White Majority in U.S. Gone by 2043, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2014, 
4:11 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/13/18934111-census-white-majority-in-
us-gone-by-2043?lite. 
 65 RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY, supra note 62, at 13. 
 66 Id. 
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slightly overrepresented in child welfare, making up 20% of children in care.67 
There are also indications that Hispanic children are coming into care at faster 
rates than other children.68 
The system’s racial imbalance is most apparent in big cities where 
there are sizeable minority and foster care populations,69 and importantly for 
this Article, where prostitution rings predominate.70 “In Chicago, for example, 
95% of children in foster care are black.”71 “Out of 42,000 children in New 
York City’s foster care system at the end of 1997, only 1,300 were white.”72 
Black children in New York were ten times as likely as white children to be in 
state protective custody.73 This imbalance is remarkable in states with high 
black or other minority populations. For example, 50% of North Carolina’s 
foster care population is black.74 In Minnesota, Native American children make 
up a shocking 12% of the foster care population; in Kansas, Nebraska, 
Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin, Native American 
children make up between 4% and 7% of the general population.75 
According to the federal government’s own studies, there are no 
statistically significant differences in overall maltreatment rates between 
African American and Caucasian families.76 Disturbingly, children and families 
of color are treated differently at all points in the child welfare system.77 
 
 67 ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY, supra note 63. 
 68 SUSAN W. DOWNS, CHILD WELFARE AND FAMILY SERVICES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE (6th 
ed. 2000); Sandra Stukes Chipungu & Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Meeting the Challenges of 
Contemporary Foster Care, 14 CHILD., FAM. & FOSTER CARE 1, 79 (2004) (citing CHILDREN’S 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 
2003 (2003)). 
 69 Dorothy Roberts, Race and Class in the Child Welfare System, FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/fostercare/caseworker/roberts.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2015). 
 70 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION 
AND INTERDICTION 33 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/psc/docs/natstrategyreport.pdf. 
 71 Roberts, supra note 69. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 African American Children in Foster Care, CHILD. SERVICES PRAC. NOTES FOR N.C. CHILD 
WELFARE WORKERS, May 2001, at 1, available at http://www.practicenotes.org/vol6_no2/cspn% 
20v6_2.pdf. 
 75 ALICIA SUMMERS ET AL., DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER 
CARE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN 3–4 (2013), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/ 
default/files/Disproportionality%20Rates%20for%20Children%20of%20Color%20in%20Foster
%20Care%202013.pdf. 
 76 See CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 1 
(2006) [hereinafter DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM], available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/print/cyf/fostercarecolor.pdf. 
 77 Id. 
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Research shows that families of color, when compared with Caucasian families, 
have less contact with child welfare workers, receive fewer services, and are 
substantially less likely to receive services in their homes.78 The children 
themselves receive fewer familial visits, fewer contacts with caseworkers, 
fewer written case plans, and fewer developmental or psychological 
assessments.79  
   Of most significance to this Article, black children are placed in foster 
care at twice the rate for white children.80 Instead of being referred to foster 
care, 72% of Caucasian children are served in their homes, while only 40% of 
Hispanic/Latino children and 44% of African American children receive in-
home services.81 Two recent studies measured African American to white 
placement disparity among children of different age groups in different regions 
and found that disparity increased for teens over time across all areas; in other 
words, black adolescents across the nation are placed in foster care at the 
highest rates.82 Once in foster care, the median length of stay for black children 
is 80% longer, with an average stay of 18 months as compared to 10 months for 
white children.83 African American children also experience substantially more 
moves while in foster care as compared to Caucasian children.84 
African American children are also less likely than children of other 
races to be reunited with their families.85 Five major studies in the 1990s, and 
one in 2005, led to the same conclusion: that Caucasian children are reunited 
with their families at four times the rate of African American children.86 This 
analysis found race continued to be a strong predictor of reunification, even 
after controlling for other factors: age of entry, parental job skills, parental 
 
 78 Id. (citing DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE U.S. CHILD 
WELFARE SYSTEM: DOCUMENTATION, RESEARCH ON CAUSES, AND PROMISING PRACTICES (2002), 
available at http://www.familyandchildwellbeing.com/images/Minority_Overrepresentation_in_ 
Child_Welfare_-_Dorothy_Roberts_AECF_Paper.pdf). 
 79 Id. (citing ROBERT B. HILL, SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD 
WELFARE: AN UPDATE (2006), available at http://www.cssp.org/publications/child-welfare/ 
alliance/synthesis-of-research-on-disproportionality-robert-hill.pdf). 
 80 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT: 
PRELIMINARY FY 2003 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2006 (2006), available at www.hhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cb/afcarsreport10.pdf. 
 81 DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2. 
 82 FRED WULCZYN & BRIDGETTE LERY, CHAPIN HALL, UNIV. OF CHI., RACIAL DISPARITY IN 
FOSTER CARE ADMISSIONS (2007), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old_ 
reports/399.pdf. 
 83 DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2. 
 84 Id. (citing CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SAFETY, 
PERMANENCY & WELL-BEING CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES (1999)). 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
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substance abuse problems, and services provided to caretaker.87 One study also 
demonstrated that children of color, particularly African American children, 
who are legally available for adoption wait longer to be adopted.88 
Older children of color in foster care also seem to receive fewer 
independent living services care. Of 98,561 youth receiving independent living 
services in 2011, the majority of these young adults were white, 32% were 
African American, and 20% were Hispanic.89 All of these factors—fewer 
reunification services, longer stays in foster care, slower adoptions, and less 
access to independent living resources—contribute to the crises facing 
adolescents of color aging out of care90 and in particular to their vulnerability to 
sexual exploitation. 
D. Projections Regarding Minority Adolescents in Foster Care 
According to the latest U.S. Census, for the first time, America’s racial 
and ethnic minorities now make up about half of the under-five age group.91 
Fueled by immigration and high rates of birth, particularly among Hispanics, 
whites have already fallen to a minority among babies.92 The government also 
projects that in five years, minorities will make up more than half of children 
under 18.93 The fastest percentage growth is among multiracial Americans, 
followed by Asians and Hispanics. Non-Hispanic whites make up 63% of the 
United States; Hispanics, 17%; blacks, 12.3%; Asians, 5%; and multiracial 
Americans, 2.4%.94 About 40% of whites age 25 to 29 graduate from college, 
compared with 15% for Latinos and 23% for blacks.95 “‘More so than ever, we 
need to recognize the importance of young minorities for the growth and 
vitality of our labor force and economy,’ said William H. Frey, a demographer 
at the Brookings Institution who analyzed the census data.”96 
In terms of the child welfare system, the percentage of Hispanics in 
foster care increased by 1% from 2009 to 2010, and has held steady at 21% for 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.  
 89 NAT’L YOUTH IN TRANSITION DATABASE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM STATE REPORTS TO THE 
NATIONAL YOUTH IN TRANSITION DATABASE, FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 4 (2012), available 
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/nytd_data_brief_1.pdf. 
 90 See infra Part II. 
 91 Kayne, supra note 64. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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the past three years.97 Also significant, “Non-Hispanic multiple race groups” 
and “race unknown” children have each increased by 1% since 2008, and have 
remained at 6% and 3% respectively.98 This has serious implications for the 
make-up of foster care in the next generation. 
There are also implications of these population changes in foster care 
for the next decade. According to the AFCARS, Hispanic children make up 
23% of the population waiting to be adopted, which means that if they are not, 
they will age out of care as adolescents in the near future.99 Unknown and 
multiple race children make up 9% and Native American 2% of the population 
waiting to be adopted, all out of proportion to their populations in foster care 
rolls.100 If these children do not get adopted, which is increasingly unlikely as 
they get older,101 they will be out on their own before they know it and 
certainly before they are ready. 
III. THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE 
Adolescents in foster care face heartbreaking futures.102 In particular, 
shocking numbers of children become victims of sexual exploitation while in 
the custody of the state or shortly after planned discharge. Caseworkers, judges, 
and lawyers know this tragic truth all too well from their daily practices.103 
 
 97 Children in Foster Care by Race and Hispanic Origin, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/6246-children-in-foster-care-by-race-and-hispanic-
origin?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/868,867,133,38,35/2638,2601,2600,2598,2603,2597,2
602,1353/12992,12993 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
 98 Id. 
 99 AFCARS NOV. REPORT, supra note 4. 
 100 Id. 
 101 N. AM. COUNCIL ON ADOPTABLE CHILDREN, IT’S TIME TO MAKE OLDER CHILD ADOPTION A 
REALITY: BECAUSE EVERY CHILD AND YOUTH DESERVES A FAMILY 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/MakeOlderChildAdoptionReality.pdf. 
 102 The tragic outcomes of youths aging out of foster care have been well documented and will 
not be detailed here. These outcomes include extremely high rates of homelessness, 
unemployment, incarceration, failure to finish high school or college, and early pregnancy. See, 
e.g., LUCY A. BILARER & MARK E. COURTNEY, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN PREGNANCY, 
SCIENCE SAYS RESEARCH BRIEF NO. 27: FOSTER CARE YOUTH 2 (2006), available at https://the 
nationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primary-download/ss27_fostercare.pdf; TIME 
FOR REFORM, supra note 11; Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster 
Youth, CHAPIN HALL, UNIV. OF CHI., http://www.chapinhall.org/research/report/midwest-
evaluation-adult-functioning-former-foster-youth (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
 103 Josh Kovner, Out of the Shadows: Sex-Trafficking a Threat to Runaway Connecticut Teens, 
HARTFORD CURRENT (Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-child-
trafficking-exploitation-p-1214-20141212-story.html?track=rss#page=1; Elissa Nadworny, FBI, 
Social Workers Unite To Attack Sexual Trafficking of Children, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 3, 
2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/nation-world/article2600436.html. 
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A. Sexual Exploitation of Youth in the United States 
An estimated 300,000 to 400,000 children are sexually exploited every 
year in the United States.104 The most frequent age of entry into commercial 
sex industry in the United States is 12 years old.105 The overwhelming majority 
of these youth have run away or been kicked out (“throwaways”) of their 
homes or foster care placement.106 According to the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, in 1999, 1,682,900 youths had a period of time in which 
they could be characterized as a runaway or throwaway youth; 71% of these 
youth were considered at risk for prostitution.107 One in three teens will be 
recruited by a pimp within 48 hours of leaving home,108 and one out of three 
homeless teens do, in fact, resort to prostitution.109 
It is extremely difficult to count raw numbers of sexually exploited 
youth.110 There is wide disparity among police reports, social service 
 
 104 See MICHELLE LILLIE, OLP FOUNDATION & HUMANTRAFFICKINGSEARCH.NET, AN UNHOLY 
ALLIANCE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FOSTER CARE AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 2 (2013), 
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/humtrafcon5/4/; Child Trafficking and Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, THORN (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.wearethorn.org/child-trafficking-
exploitation-in-the-united-states/; William Adam et al., Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Effects of 
Federal Legislation on the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND 
DELINQ. PREVENTION (July 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228631.pdf; OFFICE OF 
JUST. PROGRAMS, http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_humantrafficking.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2015). 
 105 NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR., HOUSING, HOMELESSNESS, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/NSAC11_Handouts/NSAC11_ 
Handout_With_Statistics.pdf; Protecting Vulnerable Children: Preventing and Addressing Sex 
Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (testimony of John D. Ryan, Chief Executive Officer, The National Center for 
Missing & Exploited Children). 
 106 One study estimates 30% of shelter youth and 70% of street youth are victims of 
commercial sexual exploitation; they engage in or are coerced into prostitution for “survival sex” 
to meet daily needs for food, shelter, or drugs. See RICHARD J. ESTES & NEIL ALAN WEINER, CTR. 
FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH POL’Y, THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE 
U.S., CANADA, AND MEXICO 131 (2001); see also J. M. Greene et al., Prevalence and Correlates 
of Survival Sex Among Runaway and Homeless Youth, 89 AM. J. PUB. 1406, 1406 (1999). 
 107 HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING INTO AND WITHIN THE UNITED STATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2009), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/humantrafficking/litrev/. 
 108 HOUSING, HOMELESSNESS, AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra note 105. 
 109 CASE Campaign Against Sexually Exploitation, NAT’L CTR. FOR THE PROSECUTION OF 
CHILD ABUSE, http://www.ndaa.org/ncpca_case_campaign.html/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
 110 MICHELLE STRANSKY & DAVID FINELHOR, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN RESEARCH CTR., 
HOW MANY JUVENILES ARE INVOLVED IN PROSTITUTION IN THE U.S.? (2008), available at 
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/prostitution/Juvenile_Prostitution_factsheet.pdf; see also DEBORAH 
BOYER, CITY OF SEATTLE HUMAN SERVS. DIV., WHO PAYS THE PRICE?: ASSESSMENT OF YOUTH 
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observations, and global estimates;111 prostitution is clandestine and universally 
under-reported.112 A 2008 report in Seattle found that 300 to 500 children were 
involved in prostitution in the Seattle/King County area.113 In New York City, 
estimates are even higher at 2,200 youths being commercially sexually 
exploited.114 Arrest numbers are also shocking considering they only take into 
account youth who have been found by police and are reasonably suspected of 
prostitution. Furthermore, according to federal law, the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA)115 passed in 2000, minors are not even supposed to be 
arrested at all for prostitution by any law enforcement agency in the country.116 
Despite this, in California, 804 children were arrested for prostitution in the 
year 2010 and 363 in Texas.117 
Youth of color make up the majority of sexually exploited minors. In 
Los Angeles, 38% of youth under the age of 18 arrested for prostitution-related 
offenses identified as non-white (primarily African American).118 Other 
research conducted on a subpopulation of exploited minors shows that African 
American girls and women are arrested in prostitution at a far higher rate than 
girls and women of other races involved in the same activity.119 African 
American females are also sexually exploited at a younger age on average than 
other children.120 In a Los Angeles study, 92% of all victims of sexual 
 
INVOLVEMENT IN PROSTITUTION IN SEATTLE (2008), available at http://www.seattle.gov/human 
services/domesticviolence/Report_YouthInProstitution.pdf. 
 111 BOYER, supra note 110. 
 112 STRANSKY & FINELHOR, supra note 110. 
 113 BOYER, supra note 110. 
 114 RIC CURTIS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1 THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF 
CHILDREN IN NEW YORK CITY (2008), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
225083.pdf. 
 115 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 
Stat. 1464; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 
117 Stat. 2875; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
164, 119 Stat. 3562; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-457, 122 Stat. 5044. TVPA states that sex trafficking of children occurs when anyone under 
the age of 18 is induced to perform a “commercial sex act,” which is defined as “any sex act on 
account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” 
 116 CLAWSON, supra note 107. 
 117 BRENDA ZURITA, BEVERLY LAHAYE INST., CHILDREN IN PROSTITUTION (2012), available at 
http://www.cwfa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CWA_Decriminalization-of-Prostitution-for-
Minors2012.pdf. 
 118 KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2010 
(2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/publications/candd/cd10/preface.pdf?. 
 119 CLAWSON, supra note 107 (citing R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE PROSTITUTION OF WOMEN AND 
GIRLS (1998)). 
 120 KATE WALKER, CAL. CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, ENDING THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: A CALL FOR MULTI-SYSTEM COLLABORATION IN CALIFORNIA 19 
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exploitation identified as African American.121 According to another study of 
all reported trafficking cases, 21% of victims identified as Hispanic.122 
Females make up the overwhelming majority of those exploited; a 
2011 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on the characteristics of 
suspected human trafficking incidents stated that almost 95% of sex trafficking 
victims were female.123 Young girls are also much more likely to be arrested 
for prostitution—one study found that girls under the age of 18 were over 14 
times more likely to be arrested for prostitution than their male peers.124 
One reason, relevant to this Article, that young women are so much 
more likely to become sexually exploited than males is that it has been well 
documented that females in foster care are more likely to run away.125 
Moreover, national studies have shown that 75% of all runaways are female.126 
However, male runaways from foster care and from home are also at high risk 
for sexual exploitation, particularly those who identify as LGBTQ. The primary 
reason is that LGBTQ youth are overrepresented in the homeless youth 
population.127  
 
Data collection on this population has been difficult for a 
number of reasons; many youth do not self-disclose their 
sexual orientation or gender identity out of fear of harassment 
and/or discrimination, many providers harbor bias against 
LGBTQ youth, do not question youth about their identities, 
 
(2013), available at http://www.youthlaw.org/fileadmin/ncyl/youthlaw/publications/Ending-
CSEC-A-Call-for-Multi-System_Collaboration-in-CA.pdf. 
 121 Chelsea Parsons et al., 3 Key Challenges in Combating the Sex Trafficking of Minors in the 
United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2014), available at https://www.american 
progress.org/issues/lgbt/report/2014/04/08/87293/3-key-challenges-in-combating-the-sex-traffic 
king-of-minors-in-the-united-states/. 
 122 See id. 
 123 Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children/Sex Trafficking, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. 
PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/CSECSexTrafficking.pdf (last visited Apr. 
12, 2015). 
 124 NEIL BERNSTEIN & LISA K. FOSTER, VOICES FROM THE STREET: A SURVEY OF HOMELESS 
YOUTH BY THEIR PEERS (2008), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/08/08-004.pdf. 
 125 PERGAMIT & ERNST, supra note 25, at 5–6. 
 126 Homeless and Runaway Youth, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/homeless-and-runaway-youth.aspx. 
 127 ANDREW CRAY ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEEKING SHELTER: THE EXPERIENCES AND 
UNMET NEEDS OF LGBT HOMELESS YOUTH (2013), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/09/LGBTHomelessYouth.pdf. 
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and/or are not trained in developing trusting relationships with 
LGBTQ youth.128 
 
However, a recent survey reported that about 40% of homeless youth identify 
as LGBTQ, identifying that they are homeless because of family rejection due 
to their sexual orientation or gender identification.129 This same report found 
that more than 40% of agencies serving homeless youth do not address issues 
related to this rejection.130 Another study uncovered that a disproportionate 
number of male youth held in detention by police for prostitution identify as 
gay, bisexual, or questioning; only 1% of heterosexual boys are detained for 
prostitution compared with 10% of their gay, bisexual, or questioning peers.131 
“Many homeless youth engage in survival sex (exchanging sex for food, 
shelter, clothing, etc.),”132 and this is particularly common for LGBTQ youths. 
One study found that LGBTQ “youth were three times more likely to engage in 
survival sex as compared to their homeless heterosexual counterparts.”133 
B. Sexual Exploitation of Adolescents in Foster Care 
There is an extremely strong correlation between sexual exploitation 
and involvement with the child welfare system.134 First of all, as discussed in 
 
 128 Bernadette Brown, The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of LGBTQ Youth, NAT’L COUNCIL 
ON CRIME & DELINQ. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://nccdglobal.org/blog/the-commercial-sexual-
exploitation-of-lgbtq-youth. 
 129 LAURE E. DURSO & GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST. WITH TRUE COLORS FUND AND 
PALETTE FUND, SERVING OUR YOUTH: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICE 
PROVIDERS WORKING WITH LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH WHO ARE 
HOMELESS OR AT RISK OF BECOMING HOMELESS 4 (2012), available at http://williamsinstitute. 
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Durso-Gates-LGBT-Homeless-Youth-Survey-July-2012.pdf. 
Again, this means these youths should be taken in by child welfare. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Angela Irvine, “We’ve Had Three of Them”: Addressing the Invisibility of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, and Gender Non-Conforming Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, 19 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 675, 694 (2010). 
 132 BROWN, supra note 128. 
 133 See id. (citing NICHOLAS RAY, NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE POLICY INST., 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS (2006)). 
 134 Michelle Lillie, An Unholy Alliance: The Connection Between Foster Care and Human 
Trafficking, HUMANTRAFFICKINGSEARCH.NET (Oct. 24, 2013), http://humantraffickingsearch.net/ 
wp/an-unholy-alliance-the-connection-between-foster-care-and-human-trafficking/ [hereinafter 
An Unholy Alliance]. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70; Prevention of the 
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Foster Children, YOUNG MINDS ADVOCACY PROJECT, 
http://www.youngmindsadvocacy.org/csec-2/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter YOUNG 
MINDS]; Malika Saada Saar, Stopping the Foster Care to Child Trafficking Pipeline, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/malika-saada-saar/stopping-the-
foster-care-_b_4170483.html. 
CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  2:41 PM 
2015] CIVIL RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE 1243 
Section II, thousands of children run away from foster care each year, and 
runaways are susceptible to sexual exploitation. Foster youth are even more 
susceptible. Children who have been involved with the system are the main 
target of the criminals seeking children to exploit.135 The high correlation of 
children with a history of abuse and sexual exploitation is also due to a number 
of risk factors including, “early trauma history, dangerous environments, lack 
of supportive caregiving, and severe mental health.”136 
According to one study, 98% of children who are identified as 
survivors of sex trafficking had previous involvement with child welfare 
services.137 More conservatively, the National Center for Exploited Children 
reports that 60% of runaway children who are sexually exploited had 
involvement with the child welfare system.138 Half of the sexually exploited 
children in California were placed in foster care or a group home at some point 
in their life.139 The percentages are even higher in certain areas of the state. A 
study in the Bay Area revealed that over 75% of the sexually exploited youths 
were victims of abuse or neglect.140 Los Angeles reports 61% of sexually 
exploited victims were in foster care and 80% of the girls had child welfare 
involvement.141 In New York City, 75% of sexually exploited children were in 
foster care.142 
In terms of raw numbers, which as discussed are extremely difficult to 
obtain,143 we are aware of 14,900 foster youth who were sexually assaulted 
 
 135 YOUNG MINDS, supra note 134; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 31; 
Kovner, supra note 103 (“Trafficking of children for sex . . . was, and is, happening in 
Connecticut, and is as simple as a girl, or even a boy, running away from a foster home or 
somewhere else and bumping, literally, into a pimp trolling the mall or the park for just such a 
target.”). 
 136 DANNA BASSON ET AL., WESTCOAST CHILDREN’S CLINIC, RESEARCH TO ACTION: SEXUALLY 
EXPLOITED MINORS (SEM) NEEDS AND STRENGTHS 11 (2012), available at http://www.westcoast 
cc.org/WCC_SEM_Needs-and-Strengths_FINAL.pdf. 
 137 Sex Trafficking and Exploitation in America: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 113th 
Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Joette Katz, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Children 
and Families). 
 138 Preventing and Addressing Sex Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Louise M. Slaughter, United 
States Rep. from New York). 
 139 An Unholy Alliance, supra note 134. 
 140 KATE WALKER, CAL. CHILD WELFARE COUNCIL, COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: THE 
INTERSECTION WITH CHILD WELFARE, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/BTB_ 
XXII_IIH_10.pdf. 
 141 Preventing and Addressing Sex Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (testimony of Karen Bass, United States Rep. 
from California) [hereinafter Bass]. 
 142 LILLIE, supra note 104, at 2. 
 143 STRANSKY & FINELHOR, supra note 110, at 1. 
CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  2:41 PM 
1244 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 117 
during their time as a runaway.144 Also, 1,700 foster children are known to have 
prostituted in order to receive things such as food, shelter, or drugs.145 
Sexual exploitation does not only result when children run away from 
foster care, but also when they age out of care.146 Children aging out of foster 
care become homeless at alarming rates, and, as discussed, all homeless youth 
are at high risk for sexual exploitation. The National Alliance to End 
Homelessness reports that 11% to 37% of all children aging out of care deal 
with homelessness and an additional 25% to 50% are unstably housed.147 The 
United States Interagency Council on Homelessness reports that within four 
years of exiting the system, 25% of children will be homeless.148 This is critical 
because 75% of all sexually exploited victims report being homeless.149 
Reports have shown that youth need only be on the street for no longer than 
seven days before they are at a higher risk of sexual exploitation.150 The City of 
Seattle alone estimates that there are between 700 and 1,000 homeless youth on 
any given night.151 A 1999 report found that 40% of “persons in federally 
funded homeless shelters were former foster youth.”152 In Massachusetts, a 
2005 Census of homeless young adults ages 18 through 24, found that 25% 
were former foster care youth.153 A California study found that 65% of former 
foster care youths age out without secured housing.154 
 
 144 LILLIE, supra note 104, at 10. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See id. at 11. 
 147 Mindy Mitchell, HUD Report Explores Options for Youth Aging Out of Foster Care, 
NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (June 2, 2014), http://www.endhomelessness.org/blog/ 
entry/hud-report-explores-options-for-youth-aging-out-of-foster-care#.VHTz-VfF9RE. 
 148 Opening Doors: Homelessness Among Youth, U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON 
HOMELESSNESS, http://usich.gov/usich_resources/fact_sheets/opening_doors_homelessness_ 
among_youth/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
 149 LILLIE, supra note 104, at 11. 
 150 NAT’L COAL. TO PREVENT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION, NATIONAL PLAN TO 
PREVENT THE SEXUAL ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.preventtogether.org/Resources/Documents/NationalPlan2012FINAL.pdf. 
 151 Preventing and Addressing Sex Trafficking of Youth in Foster Care: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (testimony of Melinda Giovengo, Executive 
Director, YouthCare). 
 152 Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth’s Substantive Due Process 
Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 387 (2005). 
 153 MASS. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, 18 AND OUT: LIFE AFTER 
FOSTER CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 13 (2005), available at http://www.chapa.org/sites/default/ 
files/qwert_16.pdf. 
 154 CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF THE HOUSING NEEDS OF 
EMANCIPATED FOSTER/PROBATION YOUTH 6 (2002), available at http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/ 
res/pdf/rptonthehousingneeds.pdf. 
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Youth who have already been discharged from foster care, or who are 
well aware that they will be kicked out of their group or foster homes the day 
their foster care check stops coming, are perfect prey for pimps. In the words of 
the DOJ: 
Pimps . . . manipulate children into a life of prostitution and 
then use physical and emotional abuse to keep their victims 
trapped in that way of life. Pimps target children who are 
vulnerable to exploitation, including those with low self-
esteem, who are runaways or throwaways, and who have 
histories of physical and sexual abuse. Pimps typically recruit a 
vulnerable child by first showing affection and attention and 
promising a stable relationship. . . . After the child has been 
manipulated into a relationship with the pimp, the pimp begins 
training or “seasoning” her by normalizing the life of 
prostitution and making her completely dependent on him. . . . 
To solidify his control, the pimp . . . will beat, torture, or starve 
the child to force her into obedience. Some pimps use alcohol 
or drugs to control their victims. To manipulate the child, the 
pimp also uses emotional tactics such as renaming her to break 
down her identity and telling her that she has no value except 
as a prostitute. The pimp also separates the child from 
biological family and friends as well as anything familiar. 
Additionally, the pimp keeps all of the profit earned by the 
child and delivers violent punishment if the child withholds 
any money. The pimp uses a combination of praise and abuse 
that causes the child to constantly work for his affection. The 
child becomes completely dependent on the pimp for food, 
clothing, shelter, and attention. The pimp’s control often is so 
complete that victims are incapable of leaving.155 
 
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Adolescents in Foster Care Are in State Custody 
1. Federal Law: Title IV-E Foster Care 
A child can only be placed in long-term foster care by court order 
granting the state physical and legal custody.156 State laws and regulations 
 
 155 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 31–32. 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2013) (making “a judicial determination to the effect that 
continuation in the home from which removed would be contrary to the welfare of the child” a 
prerequisite for removal and placement into foster care). For a sample of states with similar 
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govern foster care, with each state having its own unique system.157 However, 
foster care is also regulated and funded at the federal level, primarily by Title 
IV-E of the Social Security Act.158 A state’s funding from the federal 
government is conditioned on providing all children in foster care with certain 
case management services.159 Each child is entitled to a case plan which details 
their “permanency plan” and the services and care needed to help them achieve 
that goal.160 There are only five possible permanency goals: return to parent, 
adoption, legal guardianship, permanent placement with a fit and willing 
relative, and “another planned permanent living arrangement” (APPLA).161 
APPLA is the category states use when they discharge youth to their own legal 
custody after turning 18.162 No adolescent in foster care can be discharged to 
their own legal custody before the age of 18.163 Under federal law, permanency 
plans for all adolescents in foster care age 16 and older, regardless of receiving 
 
provisions, see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-908B (2014) (“A local department or a licensed child-
placing agency shall have authority pursuant to a court order to place a child over whom it has 
legal custody in a permanent foster care placement where the child shall remain until attaining 
majority or thereafter, until the age of twenty-one years . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 260C.201(a)(2) 
(2014) (“If the court finds that the child is in need of protection or services or neglected and in 
foster care, it shall enter an order making any of the following dispositions of the case: . . . (2) 
transfer legal custody to one of the following: (i) a child-placing agency; or (ii) the responsible 
social services agency. In making a foster care placement for a child whose custody has been 
transferred under this subdivision, the agency shall make an individualized determination of how 
the placement is in the child’s best interests using the consideration for relatives and the best 
interest factors in section 260C.212, subdivision 2, paragraph (b) . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
1307 (2014) (“Each court which has placed a child in foster care shall send to the office (a) a 
copy of the plan or permanency plan, prepared by the person or court in charge of the child in 
accordance with section 43-1312, to effectuate rehabilitation of the foster child and family unit or 
permanent placement of the child and (b) a copy of the progress reports as they relate to the plan 
or permanency plan, including, but not limited to, the court order and the report and 
recommendations of the guardian ad litem.”). 
 157 See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 (2014); CAL. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN & 
FAMILIES, UNDERSTANDING THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA (2002), available at 
http://www.ccrwf.org/pdf/ChildWelfarePrimer.pdf; W. VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES., 
FOSTER CARE POLICY (2014), available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/bcf/children_adult/foster/ 
policy/FCPolicyJuly2014.pdf; NYS Law and Regulations, NYSCCC, http://nysccc.org/fostercare/ 
legal-issues/nys-foster-care-laws-and-regulation/ (last modified Feb. 4, 2015).  
 158 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500. 
Foster care is currently authorized by Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, as amended, and 
implemented under the Code of Federal Regulations. 45 C.F.R. pt. 1355 (2014). 
 159 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (2013) (“Requisite features of State plan”). 
 160 Id. §§ 671(a)(15)(C), (E), 675(1)(E) (defining “case plan” to include, among other things, a 
“permanency plan”). 
 161 Id. § 675(5)(C). 
 162 Id. In each of the other goals, the legal custodian is either a biological parent, an adoptive 
parent, a legal guardian, or relative with legal custody. Id. § 675(2). 
 163 Id. § 675(5)(H). 
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their permanency plan, must include an independent living and transitioning 
plan with a written description of the programs and services that will help 
prepare the child for independence.164 
Until 2011, states could only claim IV-E reimbursements for children 
under age 18, or age 19 if the child was still in school.165 The Fostering 
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (FCA),166 and as 
amended in 2011,167 made a number of changes to Title IV-E to address the 
needs of adolescents in and aging out of foster care.168 FCA promotes the 
extension of foster care beyond 18, and conditions federal funding on ensuring 
that each adolescent has a coordinated transition plan, including health care, 
living arrangements, and employment or education plans.169 States can seek 
reimbursement for children up to age 21 who are (1) completing high school or 
an equivalent program, (2) enrolled in a post-secondary or vocation education 
program, (3) participating in a program designed to promote or remove barriers 
to employment, (4) employed at least 80 hours per month, or (5) exempt from 
the above qualifiers based on medical conditions.170 FCA also provides options 
that states may elect to improve outcomes for youth in and leaving foster 
care.171 
 
 164 Id. § 675(1)(D). 
 165 See Child Welfare Policy Manual § 8.3A, CHILD. BUREAU, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/cwpm/ 
programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp.jsp?citID=8. 
 166 Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949. The Fostering Connections Act also amended other 
parts of the Social Security Act, including Title IV-B, which authorizes federal funding for 
certain child welfare services. I am focusing primarily on Title IV-E of the Social Security Act in 
this Article. 
 167 H.R. 2883, 112th Cong. (2011). On September 20, 2011, the Child and Family Services 
Improvement and Innovation Act, reauthorizing Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, was 
signed into law. Among the many important provisions of the Act, it provides clarification to a 
critical element of the education stability provisions of the Fostering Connections Act. 
 168 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-347, FOSTER CARE: HHS NEEDS TO 
IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF FOSTERING CONNECTIONS ACT IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2014) [hereinafter 
GAO-14-347], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663655.pdf. See generally May Shin, 
Note, A Saving Grace? The Impact of the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing 
Adoptions Act on America’s Older Foster Youth, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 133 (2012). 
 169 Eyster & Looney, supra note 5. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See GAO-14-347, supra note 168, at 4. Other options include: (1) authorizing states to 
provide and receive federal reimbursement for some kinship guardianship assistance payments, 
id.; (2) allowing states to waive on a case-by-case basis non safety licensing standards for relative 
foster families, id. at 34; (3) authorizing HHS to share information from the Federal Parent 
Locator Service with child welfare agencies for Title IV-E purposes, id. at 4; (4) authorizing the 
use of foster care maintenance payments to cover the cost of reasonable travel expenses to enable 
the child to remain in the school where the child was enrolled at time of placement, id. at 5; (5) 
allowing extended eligibility for Chafee Foster Care Independence Program Services to youth 
who exit foster care to adoption or kinship guardianship at age 16 or older, id. at 42; and (6) 
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A separate federal law, The Chafee Foster Care Independence Act172 
(Chafee) was passed in 1999 to address the growing crisis of youth aging out of 
care.173 It provides grants to states, apart from their Title IV-E funds, to create 
programs that support adolescents discharging from foster care. Chafee 
provides states with “flexible funding” to “enable programs to be designed and 
conducted” to assist former foster youth.174 All states provide some extended 
services to young people 18 and older; however, the level of services varies 
dramatically among states. Some states, such as Iowa, provide robust post-
foster care services, while others provide very little support.175 
2. State Law Regarding Adolescents in Foster Care 
All states receive federal funding for foster care176 and are therefore 
supposed to comply with Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. According to 
federal law, as discussed above, states cannot release children to themselves 
(i.e., their own legal custody) until they are at least age 18.177 Since the passage 
of the Fostering Care Connections Act, 24 states now allow adolescents to 
remain in foster care past age 18,178 in some cases until age 21.179 In states that 
extend foster care, youth who are discharged to themselves may later reenter 
 
authorizing an extended eligibility for education and training vouchers to youth who exit foster 
care to kinship guardianship at age 16 or older, id. at 5. 
 172 Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1882 (1999). 
 173 145 Cong. Rec. H12846.01 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Nancy Johnson) 
(“This bill will provide, for the first time, realistic support for our most unfortunate children, 
those who have been in foster care for many years and who reach adulthood essentially alone.”). 
 174 42 U.S.C. § 677(a) (2013). 
 175 See GAO-14-347, supra note 168, at 12. For an overview on how states have used and 
enacted this grant to provide education and training programs to former foster youth, see ROBIN 
NIXON & MARIA GARIN JONES, NAT’L FOSTER CARE COAL. & CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE 
CHAFEE EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING VOUCHER (ETV) PROGRAM: SIX STATES’ EXPERIENCES 
(2007), available at http://www.issuelab.org/resource/chafee_educational_and_training_ 
voucher_program_six_states_experiences. 
 176 Title IV-E Foster Care, CHILD. BUREAU (May 17, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ 
cb/resource/title-ive-foster-care. 
 177 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(D) (2013). 
 178 Young People Leave Foster Care to a Family, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES 
INITIATIVE, http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/young-people-leave-foster-care-family (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2015). 
 179 See Progress in the States, JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, 
http://www.jimcaseyyouth.org/progress-states (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) States have either 
chosen to allow children over age 18 to remain legally in foster care under all five eligibility 
conditions described (CA, OR, TX, ND, MN, AR, IL, IN, MI, AL, PA, MD, DC, NY, RI, MA, 
ME), extended foster care under some of the eligibility conditions (TN, WA, WV), or have 
passed legislation in connection with the Fostering Connections Act and have an extension plan 
in development (NE, HI, CT). Id. 
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care.180 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) 
instructions implementing the FCA permit states to extend foster care that 
either permits youth to remain in “care continuously or leave foster care and 
return . . . at some point after attaining age 18,” as long as the original court 
order remains in effect and other IV-E eligibility criteria are satisfied.181 
B. Recent Legislation Addressing Sexual Exploitation 
In 2014, the sexual exploitation of foster children gained congressional 
recognition with unanimous passage of H.R. 4980, the Preventing Sex 
Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (PSTSF).182 “[T]he child welfare 
system as a whole has not truly recognized trafficking as a crisis within the 
foster youth population,” said House of Representatives member Karen Bass, a 
co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Foster Youth and an original co-
sponsor of H.R. 4058, during debate on the Bill.183 According to Bass, child 
welfare case workers have not been adequately trained and prepared to identify 
or respond to child victims of trafficking.184 Further, certain child welfare 
policies may have unintentional negative effects on the well-being of the 
children it is meant to protect.185 The Bill’s cosponsors acknowledged that 
some foster care regulations inadvertently increase the foster child’s isolation 
and separation from friends, family and the surrounding community, resulting 
in an increased vulnerability to victimization.186 
Title I of the Preventing Sex Trafficking Act amends Title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act by requiring each state to develop policies and procedures 
for identifying, documenting, and determining appropriate services for any 
child or youth in care who the state has reasonable cause to believe is, or is at 
risk of being, a victim of sex trafficking or a severe form of trafficking in 
persons.187 Not later than two years after September 29, 2014, states are 
 
 180 42 U.S.C § 675(8)(B)(iii)–(iv). They may reenter care until they reach the state’s oldest 
allowable age for foster care, assuming they still meet the state’s elected eligibility conditions. Id. 
 181 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 
PROGRAM INSTRUCTION 5 (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/pi 
1011.pdf. 
 182 Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128 Stat. 1919 (2014). 
 183 Bass, supra note 141. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Prevent Trafficking, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
preventtrafficking/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 186 Id. Some rules make it difficult for foster youth to participate in sports, sleep over at a 
friend’s house, obtain a driver’s license, get a part-time job, or engage in other age-appropriate 
activities. 
 187 Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128 Stat. 1919 (2013). This occurs in consultation with an 
organization experienced in dealing with at risk youth. Id. § 101. 
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expected to report of instances of sex trafficked foster youth.188 By September 
29, 2017, this data is to be included in the adoptions and foster care analysis 
and reporting system (AFCRS).189 By September 29, 2018, this data must be 
reported to Congress and be publically available on the HHS website.190 
PSTSF also requires states to develop and implement plans to 
expeditiously locate any child who has run away from care.191 Similarly, it 
directs state agencies to immediately report missing or abducted children or 
youth to law enforcement authorities for entry into the National Crime 
Information Center (NCIC) database of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.192 No 
later than two years after enactment, using the data reported under AFCARS, 
HHS must report to Congress on the children who run away from foster care 
and their risk of becoming victims of sex trafficking.193 The report must include 
characteristics of the children who run away and risk factors associated with 
children running away from care and summarize the state’s efforts to provide 
specialized services placement options to child victims of sex trafficking.194 
The report must also include efforts on behalf of the state to ensure that 
children in care form and maintain long-lasting connections to caring adults.195 
Title II of the Act requires states to support “normalcy”196 for foster 
children and extends adoption incentives. Normalcy includes implementing a 
“reasonable and prudent parent standard” for decisions made by foster parents 
or designated officials at foster care institutions. Caregivers are required to be 
trained in age or developmentally appropriate “reasonable and prudent parent 
standards.”197 The goal is to enable the caregivers to make parental decisions 
that “maintain the health, safety and best interest of the child” while promoting 
the child’s participation in “extracurricular, enrichment, cultural and social 
activities.”198 In other words, the statute seems to be attempting to make foster 
care as “normal” as possible for adolescents. 
 
 188 Id. The text specifically states, “not later than . . . 2 years after such date of enactment.” Id. 
The date of enactment was September 29, 2014. Id. 
 189 Id. § 103. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. § 104. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. § 105. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. § 111. 
 198 Id. 
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Title II of the Act also eliminates “Another Planned Permanent Living 
Arrangement” (APPLA) as a permanency goal for children under age 16199 and 
requires additional case plan and case review requirements for youth over 16 
with a goal of APPLA.200 This Act also empowers foster children age 14 and 
older to help develop or revise their own case plans.201 
These provisions are a step in the right direction toward combatting the 
sexual exploitation of youth in foster care. But it is not clear how the reporting 
directives will be enforced202 and whether state agencies and workers will have 
any incentive to be truthful and meticulous. Likewise, there is no statutory 
incentive to address and prevent actual sexual exploitation.203 Federal funding 
is not conditioned on receipt of the states’ reports or on any other 
benchmarks.204 
There is also no threat of withholding funding if states continue to use 
the APPLA goal;205 in fact, APPLA is still permitted for children over age 16 
and for children under age 16 if the state agency documents “intensive, 
ongoing and unsuccessful efforts for family placement.”206 At this point, it is 
hard to foresee this legislation making an immediate or substantial dent in the 
hundreds of thousands of youth who are currently sexually exploited, at least 
not without concurrent forms of accountability. It is important to note as well 
that the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA),207 landmark legislation 
 
 199 Id. § 112(a)(1). APPLA is amended by inserting “only in the case of a child who has 
attained 16 years of age” to section 475(5)(C)(i). Id. 
 200 Id. § 112(b)(1). In order for APPLA to remain a child’s permanency goal, the state agency 
must document intensive, ongoing, and unsuccessful efforts for family placement, including 
efforts to locate biological family members using search technologies (including social media). 
At each permanency hearing, the agency is required to ask the child about the child’s desired 
permanency outcome and to make a judicial determination explaining why APPLA is still the 
best permanency plan and why it is not in the best interest of the child to be returned home, 
adopted, placed with a legal guardian, or placed with a fit and willing relative. At each 
permanency hearing, the agency is also required to specify the steps the agency is taking to 
ensure the reasonable and prudent parent standard is being followed and that the child has 
regular, ongoing opportunities to engage in age or developmentally appropriate activities. 
 201 Id. § 113 (“Empowering Foster Children Age 14 and Older in the Development of Their 
Own Case Plan and Transition Planning for a Successful Adulthood”). 
 202 See generally id. The law requires various different reporting measures, but prescribes no 
enforcement provisions other than requiring that the HHS report to Congress the numbers 
reported. 
 203 Id. The law simply requires states to report instances of sex trafficking to both the law 
enforcement authorities and the AFCARS and to respond and locate children who have run away 
from foster care. 
 204 Id. § 102. 
 205 Id. § 475A. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). 
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passed in 2000208 and reauthorized with amendments in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 
2013, has provisions specifically targeted to addressing the problem of 
domestic sexual exploitation of minors,209 and the problem has only gotten 
worse since 2013.210 Other federal laws have also had little effect.211 
 
 208 Current Federal Laws, POLARIS, http://www.polarisproject.org/what-we-do/policy-
advocacy/national-policy/current-federal-laws (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (“The Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) is the cornerstone of federal human trafficking 
legislation, and established several methods of prosecuting traffickers, preventing human 
trafficking, and protecting victims and survivors of trafficking. The act establishes human 
trafficking and related offenses as federal crimes, and attaches severe penalties to them. It also 
mandates restitution be paid to victims of human trafficking. It further works to prevent 
trafficking by establishing the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, which is 
required to publish a Trafficking In Persons (TIP) report each year.”). 
 209 See, e.g., Summary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and Reauthorizations, 
ALLIANCE TO END SLAVERY AND TRAFFICKING, http://endslaveryandtrafficking.org/fy2014/ 
Relevant-Authorization-Statutes.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). TVPA recognized that modern-
day slavery takes place in the context of fraud and coercion, as well as force, and defines “a 
commercial sex act [as one that] is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person 
induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age.” 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9)(A) (2013). 
The TVPA seeks to combat trafficking by promoting a policy of “3 Ps”: 
prosecution, protection, and prevention: Prosecution involves passing the 
appropriate laws that criminalize trafficking, and jailing the abusers who 
exploit other humans for profit. Protection involves identifying victims, 
providing them with medical care and shelter (and if necessary witness 
protection), and, when appropriate, repatriating them. Prevention involves 
raising awareness of the inhumane practices involved in the trafficking trade 
and promoting a paradigm shift that seeks to reduce the demand for the 
“fruits” of human trafficking. 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, FIGHT SLAVERY NOW!, http://fightslaverynow.org/why-fight-
there-are-27-million-reasons/the-law-and-trafficking/trafficking-victims-protection-act/traffic 
king-victims-protection-act/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 210 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 70, at 33. 
 211 See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2013) (“Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or 
Coercion”). Section 1591 criminalizes sex trafficking, which is defined as causing a “person to 
engage in a commercial sex act” under certain statutorily enumerated conditions. Id. § 1591(a). A 
“‘commercial sex act’ means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or 
received by any person.” Id. § 1591(e)(3). The specific conditions are the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion, or conduct involving persons under the age of 18. Id. § 1591(a). The punishment for 
conduct that either involves a victim who is under the age of 14 or involves force, fraud, or 
coercion is any term of years or life. Id. § 1591(b)(1). The punishment for conduct that involves a 
victim between the ages of 14 and 18 is not to be less than ten years. Id. § 1591(b)(2). 
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. The Foster Child’s Right To Be Free from Harm While in Custody 
1. Case Law Regarding Foster Children 
Foster children’s rights while in custody of the state are not well 
settled. However, recent federal decisions indicate that, under the Substantive 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, foster children have a right 
to be free from harm while in custody; agencies can be held liable for 
deprivation of this right. According to the Supreme Court, states deprive 
individuals of their substantive due process when they are deliberately 
indifferent to their fundamental rights.212 “Deliberate indifference” is defined as 
conscious or “reckless disregard” by a state actor.213 In the last two decades, 
courts have occasionally found state foster care agencies to have been 
deliberately indifferent to the substantive due process rights of foster children. 
Until the early 1990s, there was no judicial precedent at all for a foster 
child’s due process right to be free from harm.214 In LaShawn A. v. Dixon,215 
the court recognized that children have a right to reasonably safe placements 
where they will not suffer physical or emotional harm.216 The court held that 
the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS)217 had a “special 
relationship” with the city’s foster care children.218 However, the court did not 
say what this special relationship entailed. Should the state’s action be judged 
on a “professional judgment”219 standard, meaning the plaintiff has to prove 
only negligence by the state, or must the state’s actions rise to the level of 
 
 212 See Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 
(1994). 
 213 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839 (describing deliberate indifference in the context of a prison 
official: “A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with 
‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety only if he knows that inmates face a 
substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 
abate it.”). 
 214 See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster 
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988). 
 215 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d and remanded sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore 
v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 216 Id. at 992. 
 217 Hereinafter, all Departments of Social Services that are defendants in cases will be referred 
to as “DSS” or “the state.” 
 218 Id. at 992 n.27. 
 219 The “professional judgment” standard was first articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S. 307 (1982). The professional judgment standard is discussed, infra, in text accompanying 
notes 232–35. 
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“deliberate indifference” or “shock the conscience”220 in order to find a 
constitutional violation? 
Following the LaShawn221 decision, the right to be free from harm has 
been precarious and often denied. In White by White v. Chambliss,222 the 
mother filed a § 1983 suit223 against South Carolina DSS after her daughter 
died in a foster home placement because of injuries (a blow to the head) 
sustained from the abusive foster parents.224 The mother claimed a violation of 
her daughter’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.225 The court held that negligence was not enough to prove such a 
violation; the daughter’s death did not “result from the DSS defendants’ 
violation of any ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.’”226 DSS’s actions did not amount to 
deliberate indifference because it was not “on notice of a danger and chose to 
ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice.”227 Therefore, DSS was entitled 
to qualified immunity.228 
In Conn v. Bull,229 a two-year-old foster child drowned in the foster 
mother’s pool and the county was sued under a deliberate indifference 
 
 220 The Supreme Court has established three levels of fault for state action—negligence, 
deliberate indifference, and conduct that shocks the conscience. Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833, 849, 851, 856 (1998). “Liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the 
threshold of constitutional due process,” id. at 849; “Deliberate indifference” is the standard to 
employ “when actual deliberation [by a state actor] is practical,” id. at 851; and the highest 
standard to apply is the “shocks-the-conscience” test, id. at 856. 
 221 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d and remanded sub nom. LaShawn A. ex rel. Moore 
v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 222 112 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 223 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person acting under color of state 
law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2013); see also Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 841. In the rest of the 
cases described in this Section, the plaintiffs made § 1983 claims that their substantive due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were denied. Herein, all constitutional claims 
described, unless otherwise indicated, were made by private citizens under § 1983 for violation 
of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 224 White, 112 F.3d at 734. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 227 Id. at 737. 
 228 Id. at 740. Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 
§ 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known. Thus, before liability will attach, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. 
 229 307 F. App’x 631 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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theory.230 The court held that there was no evidence that the parties were 
deliberately indifferent231 or that the individual officials were “responsible for 
assuring the safety of the home, evaluating [the foster mother’s] fitness as a 
parent, or placing [the child] in foster care.”232 At best, the facts, as alleged, 
established negligence, but they were not enough to satisfy the deliberate 
indifference standard.233 Other cases have also held strictly to the deliberate 
indifference standard, even when children have died in foster care.234 
Only recently have plaintiffs had success, but only on the deliberate 
indifference standard and only when the defendants had actual knowledge of 
the harm. In H.A.L. v. Foltz,235 Florida DSS was held liable for sexual abuse in 
the foster home because “no reasonable person in [the] [d]efendants’ place 
could have believed that, by doing nothing to protect the children, they could 
carry out their duties consistently with the Constitution.”236 According to the 
court, the defendants actually knew about the substantial risk of harm in the 
Shick home, and nevertheless acted with deliberate indifference.237 Other cases 
have held likewise.238 As the Doe ex rel. Johnson v. South Carolina 
Department of Social Services239 court noted, in a claim regarding violations of 
due process during a child’s adoption, the state has “some responsibility for 
 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. at 634. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 635. 
 234 See Lethbridge ex rel. Estate of Lethbridge v. Forrest, No. 08-11423, 2010 WL 1417778, at 
*68 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2010) (finding state not deliberately indifferent when plaintiff’s son died 
in foster care after severe abuse by foster parents); Olivia Y. ex rel. Johnson v. Barbour, 351 F. 
Supp. 2d 543, 553–56 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (finding no violation of foster children’s substantive due 
process rights even though there was a special relationship between the state with those children; 
it would be inappropriate to hold caretakers liable for constitutional deprivations when those 
caretakers had exercised their professional judgment in determining the best course of conduct). 
 235 551 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 236 Id. at 1231. 
 237 Id. at 1232 (“Taken together, these factors show that Defendants actually knew, and were 
deliberately indifferent to, the substantial risk of Plaintiffs being sexually abused in the Shick 
home.”). 
 238 E.g., Estate of Smith v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., No. 1:06cv362, 
2007 WL 2572184, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2007); see also A.P. ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver, 
293 F. App’x 635, 653, 674 (11th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims against individual defendants 
because “our task . . . is to determine what each defendant actually knew prior to the alleged 
abuse and what actions he or she took in response to that knowledge. . . . The complaint alleges 
many facts from which the defendants could, or perhaps should, have inferred that a substantial 
risk of serious harm existed in the Calhoun home; however, there are no specific allegations that 
they actually drew such an inference and then chose to disregard it.”). 
 239 597 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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[the child’s] safety and general well-being.”240 But that certainly does not 
“mean that every child in foster care may prevail in a § 1983 action against 
state officials.”241 
Only one court has held that the professional judgment standard is 
appropriate,242 but it was never actually applied since the case, a class action, 
ended in a consent decree. According to the Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue243 
court, state officials act in place of parents for foster children, who have done 
nothing wrong.244 Therefore, “foster children are entitled to a high standard. 
Something more than refraining from indifferent action is required to protect 
these innocents.”245 Unfortunately, “something more” was not clearly defined 
or applied to specific plaintiffs, and this case was not reported.246 On the bright 
side, the consent decree forced the state to achieve and sustain some 31 
outcomes in order to address constitutional concerns over foster care 
placements.247 
The Kenny A. court actually followed the constitutional standard that 
should be applied to foster children based on the Supreme Court’s other 
Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the substantive due process rights of other analogous, and less 
sympathetic, populations. According to the Supreme Court, prisoners,248 the 
 
 240 Id. at 175 (citing DeShaney ex rel. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189, 200 (1989)). 
 241 Id. 
 242 Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-1686-MHS, 2004 WL 5503780, at *3 (N.D. 
Ga. Dec. 13, 2004). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. (“The compelling appeal of the argument for the professional judgment standard is that 
foster children, like involuntarily committed patients, are ‘entitled to more considerate treatment 
and conditions’ than criminals. These are young children, taken by the state from their parents for 
reasons that generally are not the fault of the children themselves. The officials who place the 
children are acting in place of the parents.” (quoting LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 
996 (D.D.C. 1991))). 
 245 Id. at *4 (quoting Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003)). 
 246 The court applied the professional judgment standard in deciding that there were genuine 
issues of material fact for trial, but the issues were never adjudicated for more clarity on what or 
how social services should apply professional judgment. The court only found that the state 
departed from minimal professional standards by failing to (1) adequately investigate and 
respond to allegations of abuse, (2) ensure reasonable caseloads for caseworkers, (3) ensure that 
caseworkers regularly visit foster children to monitor their safety, (4) provide consistent 
casework services, (5) maintain accurate and timely casework documentation, and (6) adequately 
screen and approve foster homes. Id. at *4. 
 247 The Kenny A. vs. Sonny Perdue Consent Decree, GA. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., https://dfcs. 
dhs.georgia.gov/kenny-vs-sonny-perdue-consent-decree (last visted Mar. 1, 2015). 
 248 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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mentally ill and disabled,249 residents of state juvenile training schools,250 
suspects in police custody,251 and pretrial detainees252 all have constitutional 
rights while in custody. Importantly, adult mental institutions are held to higher 
standards than prisons. In Youngberg v. Romero,253 the Court rejected the 
deliberate indifference standard because the right to safety for the 
institutionalized was an “unquestioned duty”254 of the state and was one of the 
“essentials of the care that the state must provide.”255 Because the mentally 
disabled, unlike convicts, have not been found guilty of any wrongdoing, 
government officials cannot make decisions that constitute a substantial 
departure from “professional judgment,” causing injury to these liberty 
interests.256 The Court rejected the state’s argument that the Eighth Amendment 
subjective deliberate indifference or criminal recklessness standard should 
govern the due process rights of those who are civilly, as opposed to criminally, 
committed in state institutions.257 
Why then, when courts hold state foster care agencies accountable, will 
they do so only on the deliberate indifference standard? Foster children are 
even more defenseless and sympathetic than involuntarily committed adults. 
They are innocent children, the mere subjects (for better or worse) of the state’s 
actions against their parents, not them.258 When a child is placed in foster care, 
the state assumes the role of parent to a most vulnerable population. As one 
federal court acknowledged, “[b]y ‘finding the children and placing them with 
state approved families . . . , the state assumes an important continuing, if not 
immediate, responsibility for the child’s wellbeing.’”259 Biological parents have 
their children taken away every day in this country for actions which fall far 
below the “deliberate indifference” standard;260 surely state parents should be 
required to make professional judgments about their children. 
 
 249 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 250 Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966 (D.P.R. 1982), modified, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 
1983). 
 251 City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 (1983). 
 252 Bell, 441 U.S. at 531 (The confinement of pretrial detainees indiscriminately with 
convicted persons is unconstitutional unless such a practice is “reasonably related to the 
institution’s interest in maintaining jail security.”). 
 253 Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307. 
 254 Id. at 324. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at 323. 
 257 Id. at 325. 
 258 As demonstrated throughout this Article, state actions are often biased and subjective. 
 259 Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 260 See generally Martin Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEV. 
L.J. 805 (2006) (In “the large majority of cases . . . children are ordered into foster care even 
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2. Case Law Regarding Analogous Populations 
i. Pretrial Detainees and Prisoners 
Pretrial detainees and prisoners have a constitutional right to be 
protected from state actions, or lack thereof, which lead to their suicide.261 In 
order to prevail in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove deliberate 
indifference on the part of the state. However, deliberate indifference can be 
demonstrated when prison officials should know about a suicide risk and fail to 
take reasonable or professional steps to prevent the suicide.262 In Estate of 
Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz,263 the court held that the intake nurse, 
psychology associate, and prison guards were all subjectively aware that an 
inmate was a suicide risk. The prison officials did not need actual knowledge; 
they “either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it.”264 Once the subjective 
knowledge risk is established, they are accountable for taking “reasonable 
steps” to prevent the harm from the inmate’s suicidal tendencies.265 
Likewise, in Comstock v. McCrary,266 the court held that evidence was 
sufficient to establish liability for a prison psychologist who wrote a “grossly 
 
though they have not suffered, and there is no serious risk of suffering, serious harm,” and 
thousands of cases arise against parents in which mere neglect, based on flimsy evidence, is 
alleged.); see also O’Donnell v. Brown, 335 F. Supp. 2d 787 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Anita Hassan, 
Mixed Reviews After CPS Takes Kids from Family Shed, HOUS. CHRON. (July 8, 2011), 
http://www.chroncom/news/houston-texas/article/Mixed-reviews-after-CPS-takes-kids-from-
family-2080318.php; Alan Farnham, Answer to Recession: Houston Family of Eight Living in 
Self-Storage, ABC NEWS (July 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/houston-texas-family-
living-storage-shed/story?id=14009261. 
 261 For pretrial detainees, the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated; for prisoners, it is the 
Eighth Amendment, but the standard is the same. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 
1030, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996)) 
(“We have applied the deliberate indifference standard to a pretrial detainee’s § 1983 claim.”). 
When the § 1983 claim is based on a jail suicide, the degree of protection accorded a detainee is 
the same that an inmate receives when raising an inadequate medical attention claim under the 
Eighth Amendment—deliberate indifference. See Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88, 91 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment (which applies to persons who have 
been convicted) and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which applies to pre-
trial detainees . . . ) when he is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to an 
inmate.”); see also Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Ryan, 
957 F.2d 402, 405–06 (7th Cir. 1992). Eighth Amendment rights for prisoners are also implicated 
in suicide cases, but will not be discussed here as foster children do not have Eighth Amendment 
rights. See, e.g., Estate of Novack v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000); Estate of Cills 
v. Kaftan, 105 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.J. 2000). 
 262 See generally Estate of Miller ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 263 Id. at 989. 
 264 Id. (emphasis added). 
 265 Id. at 990. 
 266 Comstock v. McCray, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001). 
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inadequate” psychological evaluation of a suicidal detainee.267 “In this case, the 
plaintiff has alleged facts which show that McCrary released Montgomery from 
suicide watch without making any ‘reasoned assessment . . . of the patient’s 
suicide risk.’”268 The evaluation was conducted with “none of [the 
psychologist’s] professional skills.”269 Therefore, he was constitutionally 
responsible for his suicide. 
In Sanville v. McCaughtry,270 an inmate, who had attempted suicide in 
the past and whose mother had warned the prison of his tendencies, wrote a last 
will and testament and refused to eat while in his cell. The guards were 
therefore liable when he covered his cell windows with toilet paper, fashioned a 
noose from his sheets, and asphyxiated himself.271 According to the court, “it 
seems quite possible that . . . the guards could have been aware of the risk that 
Matt would commit suicide[,]”272 yet they failed to take “reasonable steps to 
prevent” it.273 The prison guards were accountable for reckless disregard—not 
actual knowledge—and for their lack of reasonable action.274 
The language in these prison suicide cases resembles the language of a 
professional judgment standard.275 Even when ostensibly applying the term 
“deliberate indifference,” the courts look to the totality of circumstances to 
determine whether due process was deprived.276 The courts find enough 
evidence when state officials fail to be reasonable.277 This line of cases is 
helpful for making an argument for liability for foster runaways. In runaway 
and missing foster child cases, a confluence of factors contribute to their 
absence from care and the harms that ensue. 
ii. Involuntarily Committed Adults 
Involuntarily committed adults in mental institutions who harm 
themselves because they are unsupervised are also protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The professional judgment standard has been applied. 
 
 267 Id. at 710. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 271 Id. at 739–41. 
 272 Id. at 737 (emphasis added). 
 273 Id. at 738. 
 274 Id. at 740. 
 275 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) (emphasizing that in determining what 
is “reasonable,” courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified 
professional, whose decision is presumptively valid). 
 276 Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 277 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319. 
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In Gann v. Schramm,278 Gann escaped from the ward by picking the lock on the 
screen to his window.279 He was apprehended by a state policeman after a 15 
minute absence.280 Upon his return, he was strip searched for contraband and 
then examined by another staff doctor who ordered a sleeping pill for him.281 
The next morning, doctors came to see Gann while on their morning rounds. 
He was still asleep and they decided not to wake him but continued “close 
observation.”282 After a roll call that same evening, Gann was reported missing 
again. A search of the ward was instituted and Gann was not found.283 The next 
morning, Gann was found dead in the closet of his room in the Admissions 
Ward.284 A plastic bag like the type used in the facility’s kitchen was found 
over his head.285 The court held that the employees could be constitutionally 
liable for this series of events under a professional judgment standard.286 The 
court held, quoting Youngberg, that “liability may be imposed only when the 
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person 
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”287 
Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne288 also involved a patient running away 
from involuntary commitment. The parents of a son who was diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder brought a § 1983 suit for the death of the son after he eloped 
from the hospital.289 The court held that even though it was a private hospital, it 
was “clothed” with the authority of state law through its contract with the state, 
among other things,290 and it acted under color of state law for purposes of the 
§ 1983 claim.291 The Fourteenth Amendment protected Schorr’s due process 
rights to be free from harm when involuntarily committed, including during the 
period he had run away, and therefore the suit was allowed to go forward.292 
 
 278 Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Del. 1985). 
 279 Id. at 1446. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. at 1451. 
 287 Id. at 1448 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). 
 288 Schorr v. Borough of Lemoyne, 265 F. Supp. 2d 488 (M.D. Pa. 2003). 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. at 496. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. 
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iii. Nursing Home Residents 
An analogy can also be made to nursing home elopement and 
wandering cases. About 10% of all lawsuits involving nursing homes deal with 
elopements, or wandering.293 Nursing homes are required by law to provide 
adequate supervision to prevent wandering and the related complications and 
injuries.294 Nursing homes regulated by federal law can now also be liable for 
deprivation of the due process rights of their voluntary residents. In Grammer 
v. John J. Kane Regional Centers,295 the Third Circuit allowed a § 1983 claim 
to go forward against a nursing home whose failure to provide proper care and 
supervision resulted in the death of a resident from malnourishment and 
pressure sores. 
If all of these populations—prisoners, mentally disabled adults, and the 
elderly—have some form of constitutional right to be free from harms that 
result from improper care and lack of supervision, surely the most vulnerable 
and powerless population in the custody of the state should be entitled to the 
same. Child wards of the state are, by definition, held involuntarily and in need 
of deliberate, meaningful decision making by their guardians. They are not 
legally permitted to run away or be missing. Their guardians are the ones 
responsible for losing them. In fact, under age 18, they are not legally able to 
make any of their own decisions. Surely these young people should not be 
responsible for ensuring their own constitutional rights. 
B. The Foster Child’s Right To Be Free from Harm When Missing 
There have been a handful of Fourteenth Amendment cases regarding 
runaway and missing foster children, with varying results and no precedent.296 
Several cases simply follow the deliberate indifference standard. In Smith v. 
District of Columbia,297 a 17-year-old was living in an apartment as part of an 
independent living program.298 There was little oversight and procedure for 
selecting these companies or the management of the programs.299 There were 
also problems with the staff itself, including a counselor buying marijuana for 
 
 293 Residents of Nursing Homes Receiving Medicaid Can Now Bring Civil Rights Claims 
Challenging Quality of Treatment, FOX ROTHSCHILD (July 2009), http://www.foxrothschild.com/ 
newspubs/newspubsArticle.aspx?id=10650. 
 294 42 U.S.C. § 1396(r)(1)–(8) (2013). 
 295 Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 296 See generally Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Nicini v. Morra, 
212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000); Tate v. Arbor Heights Cmty. Justice Ctr., No. 06-14877, 2008 WL 
3318733 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2008). 
 297 Smith, 413 F.3d 86. 
 298 Id. at 89. 
 299 Id. 
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the children.300 DSS did little, if anything, to monitor the facility.301 In violation 
of curfew, the plaintiff and his roommate let a visitor into their apartment who 
shot and killed them. The murders brought the death toll of youths living in the 
facility “to three out of sixteen (a fourth would be murdered by the end of the 
year).”302 The court held that by not adopting any criteria for independent 
living programs and falling “below what national standards of care require of 
states[,]” DSS was deliberately indifferent to the victim’s welfare.303 
Nicini v. Morra304 also used the deliberate indifference standard. 
Plaintiff was 15 years old when he went to the hospital after an attempted 
suicide, and told caseworkers that his father physically abused him.305 Plaintiff 
was placed in two foster homes but ran away; he was subsequently sent by DSS 
to live with the Morra family.306 He ran away from the Morras and then from 
the hospital to which he was admitted for psychiatric evaluation. He ran back to 
the Morras and it was eventually arranged that the plaintiff would be placed 
back in their home.307 Caseworkers checked the home and said that everything 
was positive, and there were no records of sexual abuse when the caseworker 
performed background checks on the family.308 The state and courts understood 
the plaintiff’s placement as an unofficial home, not a foster home.309 The 
plaintiff later ran away again from the Morras’ home, and “told investigators 
that since the second or third day of his arrival there, Edward Morra [the uncle] 
had been providing him with drugs and alcohol and assaulting him sexually.”310 
It was later discovered that the uncle had prior convictions of “corrupting the 
morals of a minor and for distribution of controlled substances to minors” and 
was found guilty for his actions with the plaintiff.311 In the child’s § 1983 suit 
against DSS, the court held that even though the Morras were not a foster 
home, the plaintiff was in state custody and the state placed the plaintiff in the 
Morra home over the objections of his parents and aunt, so the placement was a 
 
 300 Id. at 91. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. at 92. 
 303 Id. at 99. 
 304 Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 305 Id. at 801. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 802. 
 308 Id. at 804. 
 309 Id. at 803. 
 310 Id. at 804. 
 311 Id. 
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“special relationship.”312 However, the court held that the caseworker’s conduct 
did not rise to deliberate indifference and amounted to negligence, at worst.313 
A district court case, Tate v. Arbor Heights Community Justice 
Center,314 hinted at a standard higher than deliberate indifference, but still did 
not establish a clear constitutional right for runaways.315 Tate had a pattern of 
running away from home and was involuntarily committed to a low-security 
juvenile facility operated by DSS.316 While under the supervision of two staff 
members, Tate ran away with some young adult males, and at some point while 
away from the center, Tate claims she was raped.317 Tate alleged the staff 
violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by allowing her out of sight and 
failing to prevent her from running away.318 The court stated, “the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes on the state ‘an unquestioned duty to provide reasonable 
safety for all residents and personnel within the institution,’”319 and found that 
the staff knew Tate displayed a compulsion toward risky sexual behavior 
(running away before with young adult males), a diminished capacity for self-
control, and a known propensity for truancy.320 Her status as a state ward was 
predicated on the judgment that she required supervision to avoid endangering 
 
 312 Id. at 809. 
 313 Id. at 815. 
 314 Tate v. Arbor Heights Cmty. Justice Ctr., No. 06-14877, 2008 WL 3318733 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 8, 2008). 
 315 “Throughout this analysis, courts must acknowledge that a heightened degree of protection 
must be afforded to the involuntarily committed.” Id. at *4 (quoting Terrance v. Northville Reg’l 
Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
 316 Id. at *1. 
 317 Id. at *2. 
 318 Tate claimed that Larson and Lenoir violated her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
by failing to do more to prevent her from running away at the movie theater. Because Tate was 
involuntarily committed to Arbor Heights rather than being convicted in criminal proceedings, 
she was not subjected to “punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; the 
Fourteenth Amendment supplies the proper constitutional standard for evaluating her claim. Id. at 
*3 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314–16 (1982)) (recognizing involuntarily 
committed patient’s right to “conditions of reasonable care and safety” under the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Terrance, 286 F.3d at 848 (“The involuntarily committed have greater rights 
regarding confinement under the Fourteenth Amendment than criminals are due under the Eighth 
Amendment.”); Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442, 1447–49 (D. Del. 1985) (recognizing 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim under § 1983 for suicide death of 
involuntarily committed mental patient). 
 319 Tate, 2008 WL 3318733, at *4 (quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 342). 
 320 The court found that her impulsivity and unrestrained sexuality resulted in a serious danger 
to herself that may be likened to a suicidal impulse. As such, the court found it compelling that 
other courts have found that summary judgment is inappropriate where hospital staff disregard a 
serious risk of suicide. See, e.g., Sidwell v. Cnty. of Jersey, No. 05-cv-530-DRH, 2006 WL 
1375224 (S.D. Ill. May 15, 2006). 
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her own health and safety.321 Thus, the staff should have foreseen the 
substantial risk, and therefore, their motion for summary judgment was 
denied.322 
Ward ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver323 went further in establishing 
liability, but still fell short of declaring a constitutional right for runaways and 
missing foster children. Foster child Valerie Ward was raped while missing 
from her foster home.324 The court found that the state could be held 
responsible for the crime committed against Valerie because she had a 
tendency to run away, which the state was aware of; she was not properly 
supervised or cared for in her foster home; and she was placed in a foster home 
rife with problems, thereby exposing her to danger and harm.325 The court 
stated, 
children in foster homes, unlike children in public schools, are 
isolated; no persons outside the home setting are present to 
witness and report mistreatment. The children are helpless. 
Without the investigation, supervision, and constant contact 
required by statute, a child placed in a foster home is at the 
mercy of the foster parents.326 
The Ward court drew on other cases to show where it would draw the 
line in terms of state responsibility for a child in custody. In Zemola v. 
Johnson,327 plaintiff Elizabeth Zemola was placed in a group home known to 
be loosely structured and dangerous, even though the state was aware of 
Zemola’s suicidal tendencies, lack of self-control, and violent background, and 
it believed she should be placed in a highly structured environment with close 
psychiatric monitoring.328 While in the group home she was introduced to 
pimps, used as a prostitute for child pornography, and given drugs.329 The court 
found that placing Zemola in such a “snake pit,” constituted a violation of her 
constitutional rights.330 Moreover, the court found no qualified immunity would 
apply because it was “self-evident that by placing Zemola in an environment 
 
 321 Tate, 2008 WL 3318733, at *5. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Ward ex rel. Bazerman v. Feaver, No. 99-6745-cv-MORENO, 2000 WL 34025227 (S.D. 
Fla. Feb. 29, 2000). 
 324 Id. at *2. 
 325 Id. at *6. 
 326 Id. at *4 n.6 (quoting Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 
1987)). 
 327 Zemola v. Johnson, No. 89-c-0798, 1989 WL 88229 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1989). 
 328 Ward, 2000 WL 34025227, at *4 (citing Zemola, 1989 WL 88229, at *1). 
 329 Id. 
 330 Id. at *5. 
CECKA-PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2015  2:41 PM 
2015] CIVIL RIGHTS OF YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE 1265 
where she would be expected to be abused by outsiders” her constitutional 
rights were violated.331 In contrast, in Cooper v. Montgomery County Office of 
Children & Youth,332 the district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss 
because the causal link between what happened to the foster child when 
physically outside of the foster home—he was struck by a truck and killed 
while crossing the street—was too remote.333 
In the Ward case, while the defendants tried to argue that Valerie was 
not harmed by the foster parent or on foster home premises, the court made a 
distinction, saying that Valerie’s psychological problems and tendency to run 
away reinforced the state’s affirmative duty to the child.334 Valerie’s actual 
location at the time of the injury did not take away from the duties owed by the 
state given the circumstances.335 The court dismissed the state’s motion to 
dismiss336 and denied qualified immunity.337 
One wrongful death case also provides guidance because it involved a 
crime committed against a runaway who was not a foster child at the time of 
the murder but was receiving child welfare services at home. In Tobias v. 
County of Racine,338 the adolescent was in foster care and had a history of 
running away from home and subsequently from foster home placements.339 
The teenager was returned to her mother, but the mother signed a voluntary 
agreement to continue services with social services.340 Four months later, the 
teenager ran away again to a dangerous part of the county.341 After this 
incident, the caseworker went to the apartment and concluded that it was safe 
and left her there as long as she agreed to go to counseling.342 A few days later, 
the teenager was shot and killed near the apartment.343 The teenager’s mother 
brought a wrongful death action against the county for negligence “when it 
 
 331 Id. 
 332 No. 93-3137, 1993 WL 477084 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1993). 
 333 Id. at *5. 
 334 Ward, 2000 WL 34025227, at *6. 
 335 Id. 
 336 Id. at *9. 
 337 However, the court did not foreclose raising the qualified immunity defense when it may 
be more appropriate. Id. at *8. 
 338 Tobias v. Cnty. of Racine, 507 N.W.2d 340, 340 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). 
 339 Id. 
 340 Id. at 341. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. 
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failed to issue a capias order” for the teenager’s arrest.344 The court held that 
the injury was too remote because it was not foreseeable that a “third person 
would commit a crime against [the teenager] because of the opportunity created 
by the county’s negligence.”345 The court, however, stated that the county was 
negligent in not issuing the capias because it should have been aware that it was 
unsafe for the teenager to be out in the streets.346 Although the crime was a 
superseding cause, the court left open the possibility for state liability in a 
runaway case of a child who was not even in custody of the state, but only 
receiving state services. 
C. The Foster Child’s Right To Be Free from Harm Following 
Discharge—Analogy to State-Created Danger Cases 
No cases have been brought alleging constitutional violations for harms 
suffered by a foster child, or class of foster children, after official discharge 
from foster care. But an analogy can be made to the “state-created danger” 
cases, in which the government is held constitutionally liable for actions 
towards private citizens who are not in their custody, and are often less 
sympathetic, than foster children.347 The state-created danger doctrine was first 
developed by the Seventh Circuit in White v. Rochford348 and Bowers v. 
DeVito.349 That court held that the Constitution protects persons who, while not 
in state custody, are nevertheless placed by the state in a position of danger and 
then left defenseless. According to the Seventh Circuit, when the state, by its 
actions, throws a person in a “snakepit,” the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process is triggered.350 
Similarly, in Wood v. Ostrander,351 the Ninth Circuit held that police 
officers could be liable for the rape of the car’s passenger after the police left 
her on the side of the road in a high crime area. Davis v. Brady352 also involved 
police stopping a drunk driver. There, the police were responsible for the drunk 
driver’s injuries after the police left the driver with his keys, and the driver later 
 
 344 Id. A capias order is “an order to arrest and detain an individual for the purpose of 
guaranteeing a court appearance.” THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/ 
what-is-a-capias-warrant/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
 345 Tobias, 507 N.W.2d at 342. 
 346 Id. at 340. 
 347 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 348 White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 349 Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 350 Id. at 618. 
 351 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 352 Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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collided with another vehicle.353 The court, like the Ninth Circuit in Wood, held 
that it was the government that put this person in danger and the government 
should be held liable.354 Similarly, in Munger v. City of Glasgow,355 police 
were called to a bar when there was a dispute and ultimately kicked a man out 
of the bar and took away his keys. It was a cold night and he was dressed just in 
jeans and a t-shirt.356 The police would not let him back into the bar or his 
car.357 The man died of hypothermia.358 The court held that the government 
created the danger and the government was responsible for depriving his life 
without due process.359 
Even pretrial detainees have such rights. In Paine v. Johnson,360 the 
guardian of the estate of the pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from 
bipolar disorder, brought suit against the city and city police officers. The 
plaintiff alleged civil rights violations in connection with the detainee’s arrest 
and subsequent release from custody to a high risk situation, given her mental 
condition, in which she was ultimately raped.361 Police officers were denied 
summary judgment because fact issues existed as to whether the officer who 
released the detainee from custody violated the detainee’s substantive due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.362 Significantly, the court held 
that many factors or conduct of two or more persons may operate at the same 
time, either independently or together, to cause injury or damage; in such case 
each may be the proximate cause of an injury, as required to establish liability 
under the Constitution.363 Moreover, the court held that legal causation is a 
fact-specific inquiry and involves consideration of time, geography, range of 
potential victims, and the nature of harm that occurred.364  
Most relevant to foster children is Currier v. Doran.365 In Currier, a 
social worker transferred custody of a child from the mother to the father.366 
 
 353 Id. at 1025. 
 354 Id. at 1027. 
 355 Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 356 Id. at 1090. 
 357 Id. at 1089–90. 
 358 Id. at 1085. 
 359 Id. at 1088. 
 360 Paine v. Johnson, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1082 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 361 Id. at 1082. 
 362 Id. at 1087. 
 363 Id. at 1076. 
 364 Id. 
 365 Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 366 Id. at 905. 
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The father subsequently killed the child.367 A § 1983 suit was brought and the 
issue was whether the social worker could be held liable for state-created 
danger.368 The Tenth Circuit, finding the social worker liable under a deliberate 
indifference standard, held that the child “would not have been exposed to the 
dangers from [his] father but for the affirmative acts of the state [social 
worker.]”369 
The holdings of these state-created danger cases can be applied to 
foster children. The state creates inevitable dangers when it discharges youths 
to conditions in which they will obviously flounder. For example, states 
invariably release youths to homeless shelters with no supportive adults in their 
lives and no prospects for finding actual places to live.370 An 18-year-old girl, 
who has been discharged, with no job, to a shelter in a crime ridden area, where 
pimps are known to operate, could prove proximate cause and state 
responsibility if she becomes a victim of sexual exploitation. 
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
Now is the time for foster children to bring § 1983 claims, whether 
individually or by class action, for the sexual exploitation they endure when 
missing from foster care or shortly after discharge.371 This is the only way to 
make state agencies and caseworkers pay attention and for the recent federal 
legislation to have any teeth. It is also essential, while there is a national 
spotlight on this issue, for courts to establish constitutional protections for 
runaway and discharged foster children. 
 
 367 Id. 
 368 Id. 
 369 Id. at 918. 
 370 See supra Part II; see also Homeless Youth, NAT’L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS (June 
2008), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/youth.html; Proposed Class Action 
Settlement Averts the Danger of Homelessness for Young People Aging Out of Foster Care, 
LEGAL AID SOC’Y (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.legal-aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/ 
inthenews/proposedclassactionsettlementavertsthedangerofhomelessness.aspx (“‘An alarming 
number of young people are being discharged from foster care into homelessness,’ said Tamara 
Steckler, Attorney-in-Charge of the Juvenile Rights practice at The Legal Aid Society.”). 
 371 Civil rights actions can be brought in federal and/or state court. State courts may properly 
hear § 1983 cases pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. The 
Supremacy Clause mandates that states must provide hospitable forums for federal claims and 
the vindication of federal rights. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl.2. This point was solidified in the 
Supreme Court decision of Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
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Establishing legal precedent is particularly important because of the 
doctrine of qualified immunity from § 1983 claims.372 Qualified immunity 
protects government officials from individual liability under § 1983 for actions 
taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their “conduct violates 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”373 Before liability will attach, “the contours of the 
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right.”374 
The right can be “sufficiently clear” without Supreme Court or other 
holdings specifically on point. “[A] Supreme Court decision is not absolutely 
imperative before a law may be considered ‘clearly established.’”375 In People 
of Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners,376 the Third Circuit 
addressed the issue of how “clearly established” a law must be in order for it to 
defeat qualified immunity. A clearly establish law can simply mean that 
“officials apply general, well developed legal principles. . . . [W]e cannot 
expect executive officials to anticipate the evolution of constitutional law, 
neither can we be faithful to the purposes of immunity by permitting such 
officials one liability-free violation of a constitutional or statutory 
requirement.”377 
“General legal principles” regarding constitutional rights can emanate 
from a variety of courts with jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims.378 
Federal district and circuit courts, as well as state courts, can establish the 
principle for their respective lower courts.379 This is why we need to establish 
precedent now by bringing cases. Using the right to be free from harm and 
 
 372 See Gann v. Schramm, 606 F. Supp. 1442, 1447 (1985) (“There are four prerequisites to 
constitute a valid claim under section 1983; that is, (1) the defendants must have acted under 
color of state law; (2) the conduct must have implicated a life, liberty or property interest; (3) a 
deprivation of the particular interest; and (4) the deprivation was without due process of law.”). 
 373 Id. at 1449 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 374 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 375 Gann, 606 F. Supp. at 1449. 
 376 Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 377 Id. at 144–45. 
 378 Gann, 606 F. Supp. at 1449. 
 379 See, e.g., id. (“A ruling of the Third Circuit is enough for law to be considered ‘clearly 
established.’”); Dehorty v. New Castle Cnty. Council, 560 F. Supp. 889 (D. Del. 1983). This 
district has also noted that the rulings of three Courts of Appeals (not including the Third Circuit) 
are sufficient for a legal principle to be considered well established. Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. 
v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311, 1321 (D. Del. 1979). “[T]he only difference [in court rulings] is in 
the standard applied to determine when the violation of that right infringes upon fourteenth 
amendment rights.” Gann, 606 F. Supp. at 1450. “Although the Third Circuit decision alone may 
not have been enough to render the legal principle clearly established, . . . [t]hree circuits as well 
as a number of district courts had acknowledged such a right.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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state-created danger doctrines discussed in Part IV, we can begin to develop 
jurisprudence for missing and discharged foster children.380 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Youths aging out of foster care are one of the most vulnerable 
populations in this country. That we should allow them to transition from foster 
care to dire outcomes, only occasionally holding their custodians to minimal 
constitutional standards, is unacceptable. The sexual exploitation of adolescents 
involved with the child welfare system has recently gained much needed 
attention. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, 
discussed in Section III.B, will also help establish the right of missing and 
discharged foster children to be free from sexual exploitation. The Act must be 
publicized, the records kept and reported, and the training disseminated. This 
will be hard work, especially at the front lines. As CWLA, the only group to 
publish a handbook on working with youths missing from care381 emphasizes,  
 
those who work with children in care must proactively . . . 
prevent missing-from-care episodes, rather than merely 
reacting once a child has gone missing . . . successful 
prevention efforts are built on sound administration; quality 
supervision; effective training; and frequent contacts between 
workers and caregivers, works and children in care, and 
children and their birth families and relatives.382 
 
The problem, however, has gone on far too long to wait for the 
legislation to trickle down to front line caseworkers. Legislation targeted at 
adolescents in foster care, going back to 1999, has not put an end to the harsh 
 
 380 An example of a court using a general legal principle established by federal courts to apply 
to another context is also found in Gann: “Further support that this right to safety was clearly 
established may be found in some of the eighth amendment prison cases.” 606 F. Supp. at 1450 
(emphasis added). In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court noted that “deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
Individuals who are involuntarily confined in a mental hospital certainly should have no less 
rights than a prisoner. N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 
752, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Indeed, “[i]t would be anomalous to find that the right to a secure 
environment, which federal courts have often intervened to protect in the context of penal 
institutions, did not extend to facilities for the mentally retarded.” Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 
F.2d 147, 162 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, in December 1980, the right to a safe environment for those 
involuntarily committed to mental institutions had received wide acceptance by the courts. The 
right was a general, well developed legal principle that officials at a state mental hospital should 
have been applying daily. If they did not do so, they have forfeited the privilege of official 
immunity. 
 381 CWLA, supra note 21, at X–XV. 
 382 Id. at 9. 
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realities of aging out. Statutes and rhetoric can only do so much. Those legally 
in charge of young people must be accountable for protecting them. Sexual 
exploitation should not be an inevitable outcome of the United States foster 
care system. 
 
